Can Evidence-Based Information Shift Preferences Towards Trade Policy? *

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Abstract

We investigate the role of evidence-based information in shaping individuals' preferences for trade policies through a series of survey experiments that contain randomized information treatments. Each treatment provides a concise statement of economics research findings on how openness to trade has affected labor market outcomes or prices. Across annual surveys from 2018-2022, each administered to a representative sample of the US general population, we find that information on the impacts of trade influences trade policy preferences in complex ways. Information highlighting the link between trade and manufacturing job losses significantly raises expressed preferences for more limits on trade; this tendency is only partially offset if respondents receive additional information describing the accompanying expansion in non-manufacturing jobs. Strikingly (and rather paradoxically), information on the price benefits of trade (or the cost of tariffs) also induces protectionist policy choices. Our exploration of underlying mechanisms shows that these effects are driven in part by how the received information interacts with respondents' priors, political identity, and concerns over trade with China. The findings indicate that individuals' preferences over trade policies are not a symmetric function of the expected gains and losses from trade but instead shaped by priorities on jobs and great power competition; information solely communicating the benefits of trade is unlikely to succeed unless it addresses broader geopolitical concerns.

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1 Introduction

The economic impact of globalization has been a central issue commanding the attention of politicians and policymakers in many developed countries. In the U.S., for example, concerns over how openness to trade might affect jobs and wages have been aired since the early 1990s and intensified following China's accession to the WTO in 2001.[1] These concerns have sowed the seeds for a backlash against globalization amid the continuing decline in manufacturing sector employment (see Colantone et al., 2022).[2] Many political actors have tapped into these grievances in campaigns and crusades; recent examples include the Brexit episode in the U.K., the U.S.-China trade war, and the broad calls for export restrictions at the height of the Covid-19 pandemic. Often, these campaigns have operated by disseminating political messaging that calls for protectionist measures rather than communicating evidence-based information on the benefits and costs of openness to trade.

In this paper, we investigate whether and how *evidence-based* information on the gains and losses from trade can influence individuals' preferences towards trade policy. Can information derived from research, communicated in a concise and accessible manner, shift people's views and preferences for trade protection? Understanding how information might shape these policy preferences is critical and urgent in the current information environment. The spread of mobile devices and the rise of social media have substantially lowered the barriers to disseminating information, and political actors now regularly use digital platforms to reach out to the public, more often than not with messaging that is anti-globalization in nature. Economists have conventionally viewed trade policy preferences as being driven by whether openness to trade aligns with one's economic self-interests (see for example the surveys in Baldwin 1989 and Rodrik 1995), and more recently the impact on broader society (Mansfield and Mutz 2009) or political identity (Grossman and Helpman 2021). By contrast, less is known about how the information that the public is exposed to can in turn affect views towards trade at the individual level and the types of trade policies that get adopted at the country level.[3] From an empirical standpoint, a central challenge lies in the need to distinguish the effect of information from those of alternative forces, including the

1. During the mid-1990s, a debate emerged with some economists arguing that trade with low-income countries was responsible for low unskilled wages and increased inequality in developed countries (see Wood, 1995). Others considered instead the role of within-industry specialization and evidence from the factor content of trade to argue that the effect of trade on wage inequality was quantitatively small relative to other potential forces (see Krugman 1995, 2000). For follow-up on this debate, see Krugman (2008), Lawrence (2007), among others.

2. The Global Trade Alert tracks government policies affecting world trade, foreign investment, and migration; see https://www.globaltradealert.org.

3. An exception in the literature is Ponzetto et al. (2020) who examine how information can affect support for protectionism in a model setting in which information acquisition is costly.

possibility that individuals choose their information sources based on their self-interests and pre-existing beliefs.[4]

We address this issue by developing a series of survey experiments, conducted annually on a representative sample of U.S. participants from 2018-2022, that contain randomized information treatments providing a concise summary of evidence established by economic researchers on the gains and losses from trade. By randomizing these treatments across a representative pool of respondents drawn from the general population, the experiment enables us to establish the causal impact of specific information on respondents' subsequent preferences over policies. We focus on evidence-based information, drawing in particular on the body of studies investigating the effects of U.S.-China trade on both labor markets and goods prices, to examine whether communicating such knowledge – that is in principle more objective in nature – can move the policy preferences of a general member of the public. With this question in mind, our work differs from other studies (reviewed in Section 2) which assess individuals' reactions to hypothetical scenarios or statements crafted to illustrate the effects of trade.

Across the various rounds of the survey we administered, we maintain a consistent question format. The survey consists of four main parts, namely: (i) a background section that solicits respondents' demographic characteristics, as well as socioeconomic and political beliefs; (ii) a treatment section that offers evidence-based information on one aspect of the consequences of trade liberalization, either on jobs or on prices; (iii) a post-treatment section that solicits respondents' preferences over economic policies, including trade-related policies; and (iv) a final section that validates how well the participants engaged with the survey and solicits explanations to selected trade policy choices. In all, we have collected responses from around 20,000 participants over time that are representative of the U.S. general population. The relatively long time span of the survey allows us to corroborate our findings over 5 years of data, spanning, in particular, a period of unprecedented disruptions to the global economy and fast-changing political developments.

Zooming in on the core part of the survey, namely the randomized information, each treatment group received a concise piece of information on a specific employment or price effect of trade that has been found to be quantitatively important in economics research, in particular, by the recent influential literature on the impacts of the "China Trade Shock". More specifically, the "Trade Hurts Jobs" treatment provides a statement of the main finding from Autor et al. (2013) that the rise in imports from China hurt the labor market outcomes

4. For example, Gentzkow and Shapiro (2010, 2011) document how members of the public *de facto* sort themselves to news outlets according to their right or left political preferences. One exception in the literature is Ponzetto et al. (2020) who examine how information can affect support for protectionism in a model setting in which information acquisition is costly.

of manufacturing workers in the U.S. The "Trade Helps Jobs" treatment offers a description of how the growth in imports of goods from China led the U.S. to specialize more in its service sectors, as established by Caliendo et al. (2019), with the expansion in service sector jobs, in turn, driving an increase in total jobs in the U.S. economy. The "Trade Helps Prices" treatment highlights how the rise in imports from China led to lower prices, both for durable goods (such as computers, electrical products, and furniture) and non-durable goods (such as apparel). In a converse version, the "Tariff Hurts Prices" treatment describes the findings from Amiti et al. (2019) which show that the tariffs imposed in 2018, particularly on imports from China, raised the prices of tariff-related goods and lowered U.S. real income. While the above narratives build upon evidence on the varying effects of the "China Trade Shock", we also seek to isolate the role of "China" from the role of "trade", by conducting several counterparts "sans China" treatments that present similar information but remove the direct mention of "China".

To make the information as accessible as possible to the general public, each of the narratives is written in simplified, comparable text that eliminates technical jargon and also includes a figure that visually illustrates the key trends over time with regard to employment or price outcomes. It should be stressed that each narrative is evidence-based; in particular, we do not deliberately expose participants to misinformation, falsified accounts, or hypothetical scenarios. Following this treatment section of the survey, we then ask a series of questions to solicit respondents' preferences over a range of policy instruments, such as import tariffs, free trade agreements, and a minimum wage. We elicit these through simple "Yes/No" questions, as well as via a question in which respondents are asked to select their three "Most Preferred" policies out of a menu of eight policy options that include "More Limits on Imports".[5]

A number of broad findings emerge. First, pooling across all respondents (i.e., examining unconditional means across all control and treatment groups) shows that when asked direct standalone "Yes/No" questions about their preferences for trade restrictions, just over half the respondents agreed with placing more limits on imports (57-62% over the survey rounds). Notably, though, this support for import limits is considerably lower when respondents were asked to select their three "Most Preferred" policies out of the menu of 8 policy options: The share of respondents who picked "More limits on imports" was between 23-28% (over the survey rounds). In contrast, "Improving education and worker training", "Higher taxes on top income earners", and "Higher minimum wage" were each selected by 50-60% of respondents, suggesting that the preference for protection is not as strong when ranked

5. The different policy options were presented in a random order to each respondent, to avoid biases that might arise if there is a tendency to pick response options that appear earlier in a list.

against alternative policies that can potentially address labor market concerns. There appears to be a slight uptick in support for limits on imports following the onset of the COVID shock: 23% of participants selected "More limits on imports" as a top-three choice in the pre-pandemic survey runs, but this increased to 27-28% in 2020-2022. The support for trade restrictions also did not subside in 2022 despite rising inflation. The overall message then is that the share of support for more protection has been remarkably stable over time rather than exhibiting large swings along with broader economic or political conditions.

Second, our experimental findings suggest that exposure to information on the impacts of trade can significantly influence individuals' preferences for trade policy, but in complex and even unanticipated ways. Respondents who received the "Trade Hurts Jobs" treatment – based on the Autor et al. (2013) finding on how the surge of imports from China hurt U.S. manufacturing workers – were significantly more likely to express support for more protection relative to the control group that received no information. This treatment effect is robust across all the rounds of the experiment. The magnitude of the effect is also quantitatively important, around one-third of the effect of self-identified political position (proxied by the party the respondent supported in the most recent presidential election).

In contrast to the responses to the job-loss-from-trade information, reactions to the job-gains-from-trade information are, however, highly asymmetric. When presented with a "Trade Helps Jobs" treatment that communicates the job creation effect of trade in non-manufacturing sectors, we see a rise again, albeit to a lesser degree, in respondents' overall preferences for trade restrictions. More strikingly, exposing participants to the "Trade Helps Prices" information induces strong protectionist choices: learning that imports from China have contributed to lower prices still raises the propensity of respondents to favor more limits on imports and to support higher tariffs, with a magnitude quantitatively comparable to the effect of exposure to the "Trade Hurts Jobs" information. These treatment effects also remain robust throughout the five runs of the experiment from 2018 to 2022, despite the unprecedented array of shocks in this time period. We moreover find that when we exclude any mention of "China" from the wording of the treatment narratives, this reduces but does not fundamentally change protectionist reactions to the information treatments.

Taken together, our findings suggest that individuals do not react symmetrically to information that highlights the gains rather than the losses from trade. While the information on manufacturing job losses can raise expressed preferences for protection, information on the service-job or price benefits of trade does not reduce – and in fact provokes – protectionist tendencies. The remainder of our paper seeks to better understand what might be driving this surprising result.

We first show that a basic misunderstanding of the narrative content is unlikely to be a

primary explanation.[6] Respondents, on average, were able to correctly recall whether they had received a narrative about the effect of trade on "jobs" or "prices". This helps to rule out the possibility that respondents who say received a "prices" treatment were systematically mistaking it for a narrative about the jobs effects of trade, on which they might carry stronger negative prior views. Second, we find that attention appears to matter in explaining the treatment effects: Respondents who spent a longer duration on the survey were more likely to recall the nature of the information correctly. Furthermore, they tended to be swayed by the "Trade Helps Jobs" and "Trade Helps Prices" evidence in that their preferences for protection were dampened relative to those who spent less time on the survey. This finding is particularly relevant in an age of fast information consumption whereby individuals are increasingly exposed to condensed narratives through digital providers and spending less time processing information content, as it suggests that extended attention (if one can successfully elicit it) may enhance the effectiveness of a narrative.

Next, we explore the role of information composition. While the "Trade Helps Jobs" narrative does not exert a significant effect when presented independently, could it help mitigate the effect of the opposite narrative? When presenting the respondents with both sides of the evidence, we find that exposure to the "Trade Helps Jobs" information alongside the "Trade Hurts Jobs" narrative weakly diminishes respondents' protectionist responses. This suggests that, while exposure to the job-gains-from-trade information alone is not sufficient for shifting trade policy preferences, it can help counteract the effect of the "Trade Hurts Jobs" narrative.

Third, we explore whether there were differential treatment effects across respondents depending on their baseline characteristics, with the goal here being to assess whether the information received operates by interacting with and reinforcing other forces that themselves might influence individuals' trade policy preferences. The characteristics considered include proxies for: (a) economic self-interest, such as personal exposure (or perceptions thereof) to the labor market effects of trade, such as via one's industry of employment or education level; (b) sociotropic concerns, such as concerns over income inequality and trust in government; (c) identity politics such as prior political positions and views; and (d) behavioral factors, in particular, the degree of loss aversion. The evidence highlights the particular importance of non-economic factors. Exposure to our information treatments triggers differential and stronger reactions from those with lower household income, stronger loss aversion, and a right-leaning political position.

6. Rho and Tomz (2017) and Stantcheva (2022) document the public's limited knowledge on trade, in particular, among people with less education, but we find the level of understanding about trade does not drive our results.

Finally, we search for specific rationales by directly asking respondents who identified "More limits on imports" as a top-three preferred policy their reasons behind this choice. Among the potential explanations that we listed, including for example "not persuaded", "imports are a potential threat to national security", and "lower quality of imports", respondents expressed the highest degree of agreement with "concerns over imports from countries like China", with concerns over how "imports might compete for jobs with U.S. workers" being a close second. This pattern holds uniformly across the control group, as well as across all treatment groups (i.e., both those that received a "jobs" or "prices" narrative). That this is true even when "China" was explicitly removed from the wording of the treatment suggests that the role of China as a major trade partner of the U.S. and concerns over labor market outcomes loom large in the minds of the public when the issue of trade is raised. This finding is also echoed in an open-ended question in which respondents were allowed to freely express their reasons for preferring more limits on imports. Words including "China" and "jobs" appear with high frequencies across all treatment groups.

Altogether, our findings underscore the challenges faced when using evidence-based information to shape trade policy preferences among the U.S. general public. Exposure to such information does not always move preferences in anticipated directions: Instead, the information reinforces prior perceptions not only of trade in general but also of trade specifically with China, leading to a prior-biased belief updating that can further amplify protectionist preferences.[7] These results highlight an important interplay between information and existing considerations that go beyond strictly economic rationales, suggesting that public messaging that focuses solely on communicating the benefits of trade is unlikely to succeed and shift one's prior disposition unless it addresses the broader concerns tied to jobs and U.S.-China relations.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the related literature. Section 3 elaborates on our survey design and its implementation. Section 4 reports broad patterns of policy preferences. Section 5 presents the baseline evidence on the information treatment effects, while Section 6 discusses evidence related to potential explanatory mechanisms. Section 7 concludes.

2 Related Literature

Our paper builds on an extensive literature on the determinants of trade policy preferences (Rodrik, 1995). Baldwin (1989) divides these into two sets of explanations: those that

7. Biases in belief updating have been a crucial topic in recent behavioral economics literature; see Charness and Dave (2017) and Benjamin (2019) for a systematic review.

pertain to individuals' economic self-interests and non-economic concerns.[8]

The economic self-interest channel generally considers preferences for trade policy as being a function of individuals' endowments or sector-specific skills (Rodrik, 1995; Scheve and Slaughter, 2001a; Blonigen, 2011; Jäkel and Smolka 2017). If factors are not perfectly mobile, trade will affect income (and hence preferences) based on individuals' factor characteristics (c.f., the specific-factor or Ricardo-Viner model). If factors are mobile, trade will affect income via individuals' factor endowments in relation to their relative abundance in the country (c.f., the Heckscher-Ohlin or Stolper-Samuelson effect). More recently, economists have advanced empirical evidence that while there are aggregate gains from trade, trade liberalization creates winners and losers. On the one hand, a growing volume of studies led by Autor, Dorn and Hanson (2013, 2016) and Pierce and Schott (2016) show how import competition, specifically the import surge from China, has reduced manufacturing jobs and low-skill wages in local US labor markets. On the other hand, separate studies argue that cheaper inputs from abroad have made US manufacturing firms more competitive (Amiti et al. 2017) and non-manufacturing employment growth has more than outstripped job losses in the manufacturing sector (Caliendo et al. 2019).[9] Based on the existing theories and evidence, an individual's preferences for trade policy would be determined by the individual's perceived gains or losses from trade.

A second category of factors that may shape individuals' trade policy preferences relates to non-economic concerns, specifically, social and political identity and behavioral patterns. As Grossman and Helpman (2021) note, preferences over trade policy may reflect not only voters' economic incentives and self-interests but also "concerns for members of those groups in society with whom they identify." Changes in such social identity due to, for example, increased income inequality or societal divisions can lead not only to so-called identity politics but also to changes in trade policy (Rotemberg, 2003). Similarly, Mansfield and Mutz (2009) argue that trade attitudes are guided less by material self-interest than by perceptions of how the US economy as a whole is affected by trade. In addition to social and political identity, another non-economic factor is the behavior of loss aversion, that is, the manifestation of an asymmetry in value associated with loss versus gains wherein the disutility of giving up

8. Another branch of the literature has focused on the role of lobbying and interest groups in shaping the "demand-side" of trade policy (see Grossman and Helpman, 1995; Krishna, 1998; Ornelas, 2005; Bombardini, 2008; Blanga-Gubbay, Conconi, and Parente, 2022).

9. It is worth noting that the debate on whether international trade has been the main reason behind stagnated low-skill wages is far from settled in the academic literature. As documented by Lawrence and Lawrence (2012), manufacturing employment has fallen steadily among most developed nations for decades. A leading alternative hypothesis for the swift decline of manufacturing jobs is technological change whereby the rise of computers, automation, and robotics has been the main force displacing low-end manufacturing jobs (see Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2017).

an object is greater than the utility of acquiring it (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, 1984). Freund and Ozcan (2008) and Tovar (2009) show that loss aversion can lead to anti-trade bias in trade policy that favors declining and loss-incurring domestic industries.[10]

The above array of hypotheses has been examined in a body of empirical work assessing the determinants of trade policy preferences based on observational survey data. The body of evidence on Stolper-Samuelson vs Ricardo-Viner is relatively mixed; see, for instance, Balistreri (1987), Beaulieu (2002ab), and Mayda and Rodrik (2005). These studies have found mixed support for the role of economic self-interests by examining the effects of human capital endowments and industry characteristics (as a proxy for exposure to trade) on expressed policy preferences. For example, using survey data from the American National Election Studies (ANES), Blonigen (2011) finds that despite the evidence on the substantial effect of trade policy on worker income, the relationships between labor market attributes and trade policy preferences are not robust in the US, and suggests that either the measures of labor market attributes are poor or the drives of trade policy preferences go beyond labor market incentives. Blonigen and McGrew (2014), based on similar ANES survey data, explore how task routineness may affect trade policy preferences and find workers performing more routine tasks to be more supportive of import restrictions. The study also shows that education and task routineness are the only two labor market attributes found to be correlated with stated trade policy preferences.[11]

Our paper contributes to the above literature by investigating the role of information pertaining to the gains and losses from trade in shaping individuals' trade policy preferences. Most studies so far have tended to assume individuals are perfectly informed about the positive and negative economic impacts of trade and determine their policy preferences in a full-information environment, while in reality members of the public may be less than fully informed or may even be exposed to a biased set of information. Could access to evidence-based information and becoming better informed on the gains or losses from trade align people's policy choices more closely with their labor market characteristics and economic

10. More subtly, opposition toward free trade could be driven by uncertainty over the distribution of gains versus losses from adopting such a policy (Fernandez and Rodrik 1991).

11. There is a parallel literature on migration policy preferences that has explored the role of economic circumstances, individual characteristics, and also locational externalities (e.g., fiscal spillovers); see in particular, Scheve and Slaughter (2001b), Mayda (2069), Facchini and Mayda (2008), Card et al. (2012), Mayda et al. (2022), Alesina et al. (2019). There is a broader literature on whether trade policy shapes aggregate voting patterns and electoral outcomes: Autor et al. (2020) and Che et al. (2016), Fetzer and Schwarz (2021), Lake and Nie (2021), Choi et al. (2021), Blanchard et al. (2022) for the US; Colatone and Stanig (2018) on Brexit; Dippel et al. (2022) for Germany; Ogeda et al. (2021) on Brazil; Van Patten and Mendez (2022) explore the role of economic factors in the Costa Rica-US CAFTA referendum. On the other hand, see Conconi et al. (2014) for evidence that the proximity of elections shapes the trade policy positions that U.S. politicians adopt.

self-interests? Could learning more about gains from trade mitigate the protectionist desire that is unsupported by economic rationale?

To answer these questions, we use an approach of randomized survey experiments that enables us to address the issue of self-selection and unobservables in determining individuals' exposure to information and establish the causal impact of information on expressed policy preferences. A key challenge in assessing the role of information is potential correlations between individual characteristics and exposure to information the latter of which often relies on proxy measures in existing surveys. The randomized survey methodology enables us to provide short-term but exogenous treatments to individuals' information sets. It also allows us to gain an in-depth understanding of individuals' policy choices and underlying rationales.

The methodology of randomized information treatments in general-population surveys has been applied in empirical public finance to understand support for policies related to redistribution and taxes (Kuziemko et al. 2015; Fisman et al. 2017; Alesina et al. 2018).[12] The evidence from this line of work is, however, mixed; for example, Kuziemko et al. (2015) do not find providing information related to inequality to affect expressed preferences towards taxation, a result attributed to the lack of trust in government. More recent applications that explore the degree of support or opposition for economic policy include Alesina et al. (2019), Facchini et al. (2016) and Grigorieff et al. (2017) on immigration, Hiscox (2006), Nguyen (2017), Rho and Tomz (2017), Di Tella and Rodrik (2020) and Rodriguez et al. (2021) on trade, as well as Stantcheva (2022) on various economic policies.

Specifically, in trade-related studies, Di Tella and Rodrik (2020) provide information treatments consisting of hypothetical scenarios of job losses (due to demand, technology, management, and trade) in an assumptive manufacturing plant to understand whether and how the various causes of job losses might affect preferences over remedial policies. Rodriguez et al. (2021) examine the role of question framing in respondents' expressed beliefs on the employment and consumption effects of trade. Stancheva (2022) uses surveys to elicit respondents' knowledge and understanding of trade and finds both material self-interest and social and economic concerns to influence people's views on trade policy. The paper also shows that beliefs in efficiency gains and compensatory redistribution can reduce trade opposition.

Our study complements the above studies by investigating the role of evidence-based information in shaping people's attitudes and policy preferences. Instead of eliciting responses to hypothetical or framed questions, we convey concise, accessible information on

12. This, in turn, draws on work in the psychology literature on attitudes towards income inequality including, for example, Norton and Ariely (2011), and Chow and Gallak (2012).

the documented gains and losses from trade in a format similar to information individuals are exposed to on daily digital platforms and explore whether and how trade policy preferences might be influenced by the information treatments. By conducting numerous rounds of the survey over a four-year period of unprecedented disruptions, our study also offers insights into how the role of information may evolve with political and economic shocks. The analysis highlights the complex and often unanticipated ways in which the public responds to trade-related evidence. Among specific groups characterized by adverse perceptions of trade and China, exposure to information on the effects of trade can trigger reactions unsupported by economic self-interests by provoking priors and broad concerns. Nevertheless, awareness of the gains from trade can still counteract loss-centered narratives and neutralize anti-trade tendencies. These documented findings are robust throughout the unusually long and disruptive survey period and are unaffected by shocks including the pandemic, the US-China trade war, fast-rising inflation, and other political and economic movements. The results highlight the challenges of communicating the benefits of trade in an environment dominated by contrary prior belief and fast information consumption and offer an explanation for the discrepancy documented in the literature between economic self-interests and trade policy choices.

3 Survey Design: Methodology and Instrument

To overcome the challenge of establishing the causal effect of information, we developed and conducted a series of surveys that contained randomized information treatments to a nationally representative sample of the US population (by age, gender, race, education, and region). Randomized provision of information allows the researcher to estimate a causal effect of information exposure on policy preferences, as the information narratives provided constitute an exogenous source of variation across respondents. By analyzing the collected survey data through multivariate regressions, we can then identify the importance of information relative to other respondent characteristics (e.g., age, gender, education, political ideology, etc.) in driving individual preferences over economic policies.

Mounted on Qualtrics.com, the survey is designed to be relatively short, taking an average of about ten minutes to complete.[13] The survey consists of four main parts, including a background section that solicits respondents' demographic and belief information, a treatment section that offers evidence-based information on either the gains and/or the losses from trade, a section that solicits respondents' preferences over economic policies, and a final

13. The 2022 survey platform can be accessed at: https://hbs.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV$_e$$sNIwUlv3V4Iufc$.

section that validates how well the participants have engaged with the survey and explores explanations to their choices. We engaged the services of a professional survey company (Qualtrics) to administer the survey online to a nationally representative sample of the US population (by age, gender, race, education, and region).[14]

Part 1: Background. The first section of the survey solicits basic background information from the respondent, including:

(a) Biodata: age; gender; ethnicity; nationality; state of residence; level of education; employment status; sector; occupation; household income;

(b) Economic, social and political beliefs

- Economic: his/her degree of satisfaction with the health of the job market; views future prospects of children born into their community; views on tariff rates; top export destinations; the impact of NAFTA on the respondent's family; view on the job as giving a sense of identity; how big a problem is an inflation in the U.S.
- Social: how big a problem he/she perceives inequality to be in the US today; how much he/she trusts the government; trust in foreigners; willingness to pay more for a US brand;
- Political: self-placement on liberal vs. conservative policy spectrum; which party's candidate he/she supported in the presidential elections;
- Behavioral: loss aversion proxies.

(c) News Sources: frequency he/she follows the news; main news sources (both TV and internet); etc.

Part 2: Information Treatments. The second part of the survey administers the information treatment. Respondents are randomly allocated to the control group or one of the information treatment groups, each with equal probability. Each of the narratives stresses a particular employment or price effect of being open to trade that has been found to be quantitatively important in economics research:

14. The sampling quotas requested were: (i) by gender, female: 50.8%, male: 49.2%; (ii) by age, 18-24: 12.8%, 25-34: 17.7%, 35-44: 16.7%, 45-54: 17.7%, 55-64: 16.4%, 65+: 18.8%; (iii) by race, non-Hispanic White: 61.9%, non-Hispanic Black: 12.3%, Hispanic: 17.4%, Asian: 5.3%, Other: 3.2%; (iv) by education, HS diploma/GED or less: 40.8%, some college (no degree): 20.9%, college degree: 26.9%, graduate degree: 11.4%; and (v) by region, Midwest: 21.33%, Northeast: 18.02%, South: 37.27%, West: 23.38%. Participants who completed the survey received compensation of around $2.00 each. We did not seek to assemble a longitudinal panel of the same individuals due to the common restriction of low re-contact rates in addition to budget constraints.

(a) The "Trade Hurts Jobs" narrative is a three-sentence summary of the findings from Autor et al. (2013), that points to how the rise in imports from China negatively impacted the labor market outcomes of manufacturing workers in the US.

(b) The "Trade Helps Jobs" narrative is a description of how the rise in imports from China led the US to specialize more in service sectors and in turn to an increase in the total number of jobs in the US economy, as established by Caliendo et al. (2019).

(c) The "Trade Helps Prices" narrative discusses how the rise in imports from China led to lower prices for both durable goods such as computers, electrical products, and furniture, and non-durable goods such as apparel. In the 2020 and 2021 runs on the survey, we also exposed participants to two variants of this treatment that were similarly randomized to survey respondents. The first variant replaced the phrase "availability of cheaper goods" with "increased availability of goods" to explore the possibility that the adjective "cheap" might have triggered negative connotations (e.g., associated with "low-quality"). The second variant did not mention "China", referring instead to a general increase in imports.

(d) Starting in 2020, and following the resurgence in US import tariffs, we also introduced a "Tariff Hurts Prices" narrative based on the findings from Amiti et al. (2019). This describes how the tariffs imposed in 2018, particularly on imports from China, raised the prices of tariff-related goods, which incurred an estimated loss to US real income of $1.4 billion per month.

To make the information as accessible as possible to the general public, each of these narratives includes text that is simplified to eliminate technical jargon, as well as a figure to visually illustrate the key trends over time with regard to either labor market outcomes or good prices. For example, in the "Trade Hurts Jobs" treatment, we reproduced Figure 1 from Autor et al. (2013), which overlays the increase in imports from China between 1987-2007 with the contemporaneous decline in manufacturing employment as a share of US employment. Likewise, in the "Trade Helps Jobs" treatment, we created an analogous figure in which the decline in manufacturing employment was replaced in the illustration by the rise in total US nonfarm employment instead.[15] It should be stressed that each narrative is evidence-based; in particular, we do not deliberately expose participants to misinformation, falsified accounts, or hypothetical statements. The accompanying tone of each narrative also seeks to be neutral and factual. (The narratives are reproduced in the Appendix.)

Part 3: Policy Preferences. The third section of the survey then solicits preferences over

15. While an academic citation is provided on the information screen, the identities of the institutions at which the researchers work was not included to avoid possible reputation effects that could potentially bias how much weight the respondents attached to the narratives.

economic policies. The questions we focus on when constructing a measure of preferences for protection are the following:

(a) "Do you support placing more limits on import?" Respondents were asked to respond Yes or No, and "If Yes, on which countries?"
(b) "Would you support an increase in the US tariff rate to reduce imports?" Respondents were asked to respond Yes or No, and "If yes, what would you like the US tariff rate on imports to be?"
(c) "Would you support the US signing free trade agreements with more foreign countries?" Respondents were asked to respond Yes or No.
(d) A simple choice of policy preferences between "higher taxes on top income earners" and "higher tariff rates on imports from foreign countries"; respondents where given the option to select just one of these two policies, or to respond "both" or "neither".

We also sought a better gauge of how strong the preference for protectionism is relative to other policies that can help to address labor market outcomes. Toward this end, we included a question in which respondents are presented with a menu of eight policy options, and then asked to identify their three "Most Preferred" and three "Least Preferred" policies. The eight policy options are presented on the survey screen in a random order, to avoid possible biases towards policies based on the order in which they appear as response options:[16]

(a) Higher taxes on top income earners;
(b) Higher minimum wage;
(c) More benefits for the unemployed (e.g., unemployment insurance);
(d) Improving education and worker training;
(e) More limits on imports from foreign countries (e.g., higher tariffs on imports);
(f) Weakening the U.S. dollar, so that U.S. exports are more competitive;
(g) Exiting from existing free trade agreements;
(h) More limits on immigration.

Part 4: Validate and Explain Choices. Starting in the 2020 survey run, we included a fourth section that seeks to validate how well the participants engaged with the survey as well as to solicit their reasons if they had selected "More Limits on Imports" as a top-three preferred policy. The key questions here include:

16. This follows recommendations of survey practice to avoid choice biases that could arise from the order of response options; see: `https://www.qualtrics.com/support/survey-platform/survey-module/question-options/choice-randomization/`.

(a) Did the information that you read earlier in this survey affect your views on trade policy (i.e., the use of tariffs or limits on imports)? (Responses were recorded on a Likert scale with five options, ranging from "Strongly Disagree" to "Strongly Agree".)

(b) The information that I read earlier in this survey was on the topic of:

- the relationship between trade and prices
- the relationship between trade and technology
- the relationship between trade and jobs
- I did not receive information on any of the above

(c) Why "More Limits on Imports"? Survey participants who selected this as a top-three preferred policy were directed to this follow-up question where they were reminded of their policy choice. They were then asked to assess the extent to which each of the following reasons might explain their selection of "More Limits on Imports": (Responses were recorded on a Likert scale with five options, ranging from "Strongly Disagree" to "Strongly Agree".)

- I am concerned about US imports from countries such as China.
- Imports are a potential threat to US national security.
- Imports are often of lower quality.
- Even if imports have also helped to create jobs in certain sectors (lower goods prices), there are other more important concerns.
- I was persuaded that imports have hurt jobs in the US (have lowered goods prices for Americans).
- Imports often compete for jobs with US workers.

In total, we conducted five annual runs of the survey, which we group into 4 rounds as described below.The first round of the survey consisted of two runs launched in July 2018 and April 2019, which yielded a total of 2,277 usable observations.[17] These surveys offered the "Trade Hurts Jobs," "Trade Helps Jobs," and "Trade Helps Prices" treatments; we have grouped these two pre-pandemic runs of the survey as a single "round" due to the smaller number of observations relative to later editions. The second-round survey was conducted from April-June 2020 to a sample of 6,009 participants; this included the same treatments as in round 1 plus the "Tariff Hurts Prices" narrative, on recent evidence concerning the new US tariffs and their impact on goods prices. This second round also included mixed treatments that combined both the "Trade Hurts Jobs" and "Trade Helps Jobs" narratives, as well

17. More specifically, the round 1 sample was composed of around 550 observations assigned to each of the "Control", "Trade Hurts Jobs", "Trade Helps Jobs", and "Trade Helps Prices" treatments.

as the two variants of the "Trade Helps Prices" narratives. The third round, performed in April 2021, yielded a sample of 4,058 participants; this consisted of all the previous treatments and additional questions with respect to the effects of the Covid-19 pandemic and US government's relief packages.[18] The fourth round was administered in April 2022 and consisted of 4,186 observations and again in July 2022 with 1,800 observations. In addition to the above questions, we requested views on whether the participant considered inflation to be a concern. The different rounds yielded a total sample of over 20,000 survey respondents. In the analysis, we account for and explore the different timings of the three rounds when assessing the effects of the information treatments.

In addition to the information collected in the survey, we also obtained data on the counties where the respondents are located. We then merge in the identities of the counties for the majority of the respondents on the basis of the city or town names that they provided.[19] This allows us to subsequently merge in a set of location characteristics from standard sources of county-level data for between 96.9% and 98.6% of our observations, depending on the survey run.[20]

4 Broad Patterns of Policy Preferences

In this section, we provide a first look at the broad patterns of policy preferences emerging from the data collected by examining the composition of the samples with regard to respondent characteristics and expressed preferences over policies.

Table 1 reports summary statistics for each of the three survey rounds on a range of underlying characteristics of the participants. This includes background biographic information (e.g., gender, age, race), socioeconomic characteristics (e.g., education, household

18. These questions include, for example, "whether countries should be able to restrict the movement of people across borders," "whether countries should avoid imposing tariffs on imports of medical products and health equipment," "whether countries should avoid imposing tariffs on imports of goods that are needed in supply chains," "whether countries should be able to restrict the export of medical products and health equipment," "whether countries should keep the manufacture of goods that are needed in supply chains at home and avoid moving production abroad," and "how has the coronavirus (Covid-19) pandemic affected your views of China?"

19. This was done via a Stata fuzzy merge command (`reclink`). To improve the merge rate, observations with a fuzzy merge score of lower than 0.93 were double-checked manually to see if the name of the city or town could be identified after correcting for spelling errors, the use of abbreviations (e.g., "St." versus "Saint"), and differences between colloquial and formal naming conventions (e.g., "St. Pete" versus "St. Petersburg). For a number of observations where there was potential ambiguity, the IP address coordinates were used to corroborate the likely location of the respondent.

20. As a check of the data consistency and quality, we dropped a small fraction of observations from each survey sample that had respondent IP address coordinates originating from outside the United States. The fraction of observations dropped was less than 0.3% for the entire sample. We also removed observations that took less than half the median completion time to ensure a reasonable amount of time spent in completing the survey.

income, employment), socio-political attitudes (e.g., the candidate supported in the 2016 presidential election), and news consumption patterns. With the information provided by the respondents on their state and city/town of residence, we were further able to merge in location characteristics at the county level; this includes various economic conditions that the respondent would in principle be exposed to, such as the college-educated share of the population aged 25 or older (from the American Community Survey), the local share of manufacturing in total employment (from the County Business Patterns dataset), the Autor et al. (2013) China import shock (from the 2000s), and a dummy variable for whether the location is an urban county (from the US Census).[21] Across the columns in Table 1, the respondent and location characteristics are broadly similar across survey rounds. The average characteristics of the respondents, including, for example, gender, age, and education, are broadly consistent with the distributions of the US general population. It is worth noting that across the socio-political attributes, the average respondent exhibited a slight level of distrust in government, considered the impact of NAFTA on their family and the health of the job market somewhat negatively, and expressed a preference for US brands. The participants also viewed both inequality and inflation as a problem, with the concern over inflation appearing stronger in 2022.

Turning to policy preferences, Table 2 (top panel) presents the declared support for protectionist policies when this is posed in a direct "Yes/No" question. When phrased in this manner, a fairly high share of respondents tended to agree with placing more limits on imports (57-62%, across the three survey rounds). Note, however, that the share of respondents favoring alternative policies, such as minimum wages and progressive taxation was consistently higher (65%-80%).[22]

The lower panel summarizes the frequency with which each of the eight options was identified among the respondents' three most-preferred economic policies. While the means reported here are unconditional – calculated pooling across all survey respondents – they nevertheless bring to light several stylized facts. Anti-globalization policies received a lower level of support when compared to alternative tax or labor market policies. The share of respondents who selected "More limits on imports" was in the 23-38% range, while the corresponding shares that picked "More limits on immigration" ranged between 34%-37%. Only around 12% of respondents identified "Exiting from free trade agreements" as a preferred course of action.

21. The college share and manufacturing share variables are constructed for the year 2016.

22. Interestingly, between 65-68% of the survey participants, also favored signing new free trade agreements. It is possible that some respondents may not see raising limits on imports and signing more free trade agreements as contradictory, for example since these moves could each be pursued with different foreign countries.

In contrast, policies to "Improve education and training", "Higher minimum wage", and "Higher taxes on top income earners" (i.e., more progressive taxes) each received broader support from about 50-60% of the respondents. Not all public assistance programs received high support though, as only about a quarter of respondents identified "More unemployment benefits" as a preferred policy. The option that received the least support was to "Weaken the US Dollar" (7-9% only).[23] Of note, the ranking of the most-preferred policies was stable across survey runs. Breaking down these preferences over policy by location, the variation across regions is broadly consistent with the well-known geographic divisions supporting the Republican versus Democratic party (available on request).

Over time, rounds 2-4 of the survey uncover a slight uptick in preferences for "More Limits on Imports": 23% of participants selected this as a top-three policy in 2018-2019, rising to 27% in 2020 and at 28% in 2021 and 27% in 2022. This came at the expense of a corresponding waning in support for a "Higher minimum wage", and for "Improving education and training".

A useful point to highlight is the contrast in the level of support for protection expressed in the direct "Yes/No" questions, as compared to the shares who picked these among their top-three preferred policies in the lower panel. The latter question format appears to be useful in teasing out how anti-globalization policies appear to receive less support relative to alternative actions once respondents are asked to consciously prioritize and rank from a menu of policy options.

5 Baseline Evidence

5.1 Empirical Specification

We now turn to the task of identifying whether and how much the information treatments affected respondents' policy preferences. We evaluate this formally by adopting the following regression specification:

$$\mathbf{1}(Policy_i) \;=\; \sum_{b=1}^{B} \beta_b \mathbf{1}(Treatment_i = b) + \gamma X_i + \epsilon_i, \tag{1}$$

where $\mathbf{1}(Policy_i)$ is a dummy variable for whether respondent i expressed support for the policy measure in question, while the $\mathbf{1}(Treatment_i = b)$'s are dummy variables for whether the respondent received the survey format that contained information treatment b. We

23. The summary statistics based on the survey question on one's least-preferred policies yielded a consistent message, with "Improve education and training", "Higher minimum wage", and "Higher taxes on top income earners" being least likely to be selected.

denote the control group that received no information by $b = 0$, and this is the omitted treatment category in (1). The coefficients β_b, for $b = 1, \ldots, B$, therefore capture the effects of the respective information treatments relative to the control group. These can be accorded a causal interpretation, given the randomization of respondents to treatment narratives. (Appendix Tables 1a-1d confirm overall that within each survey round, the randomization achieved balance in respondent characteristics across the treatment subsamples.)[24]

We include on the right-hand side of (1) a large vector of controls, X_i, to account for any other systematic correlations between these observed respondent characteristics and expressed policy preferences. This includes: (i) standard biographic variables (such as gender, age group, race, education, employment status, and region of birth); (ii) prior political position (namely, the party candidate supported in the 2016 presidential election); and (iii) news consumption habits (i.e., frequency and main news sources). To capture the effects of these preceding variables as flexibly as possible, we control for each using a set of dummies based on the response options from the associated survey question.

We further control in (1) for the role of several county-level socio-economic conditions, specifically how these might have shaped respondents' views towards policy. As described earlier, the county variables we control for are the college-educated share, the manufacturing share in local employment, the Autor et al. (2013) China import shock, and an urban dummy. Each of these location characteristics is constructed at the county level, except for the China import shock measures which are at the more aggregated commuting-zone level.

Note that the underlying randomization implies that the assignment of information treatments should be orthogonal to any respondent or location characteristics, and so whether or not we control for the vector X_i should not undermine the consistency of the β_b's as estimates of the information treatment effects. That said, we find it useful to control for these characteristics, to provide a point of comparison with what the prior literature has found with regard to correlates of preferences for trade protection.

Last but not least, we also account for several survey features. When the dependent variable is the indicator for whether "More Limits on Imports" was selected as a top-three preferred policy, we include a "randomization order" variable whose value is equal to the position (i.e., first to eighth) in which "More Limits on Imports" appeared to the individual respondent in the menu of eight policy options. This is meant to control for any tendency towards picking policies that appear earlier in the list of response options. We also include

24. Note that the "Trade Helps Prices sans China" and "Trade Helps Prices sans Cheaper" treatments both have significantly older and slightly less educated respondents (last two columns Appendix Table 1b). The balance test statistic for Round 2 is significant at 5% (p-value<0.05). However, if we drop these two characteristics from the joint test of balance, the balance test is significant at 1%. As we condition on age and education in the regression analysis, this does not affect our results.

dummy variables for whether the survey was taken on a mobile device (to control for possible systematic differences across mobile and non-mobile device users), as well as for the week the response was recorded (to capture forces related to the weekly news cycle).[25]

In what follows, we cross-validate our findings by using an array of dependent variables that are constructed from the various survey questions that speak to respondents' trade policy preferences. Specifically, we run logit regressions based on equation (1) using in turn the following variables as $\mathbf{1}(Policy_i)$: (i) whether a "Yes" answer was recorded on the binary-response question "Do you support placing more limits on imports?"; (ii) whether a "Yes" answer was recorded on the binary-response question "Would you support an increase in the US tariff rate?"; (iii) whether a "Yes" answer was recorded on the binary-response question "Would you support signing more FTAs?"; (iv) whether the respondent selected "Higher tariffs on imports from foreign countries" or "Both" (higher tariffs and higher taxes on top income earners) on the question soliciting preferences over these two policies; and (v) whether the respondent selected "More limits on imports" as one of his/her three "Most Preferred" out of the list of eight policies. When presenting results from these logit regressions, we will report marginal effects that are evaluated by setting the information treatment dummies $\mathbf{1}(Treatment_i = b)$ to zero and the respondent characteristics in X_i to their in-sample mean values.

In addition, we report results run via OLS using the first principal component of (i)-(v) as the dependent variable; we subtract the binary response to the question "Would you support signing more FTAs?" from one prior to taking this first principal component. This yields a measure that is increasing in the intensity of individuals' preferences for protection, that in principle dampens the effect of measurement error that might be inherent in the responses to any single survey question. We report throughout standard errors that are clustered by county of residence. Note that the β_b coefficients obtained from these regressions should be interpreted as information treatment effects holding the extensive set of respondent characteristics constant.[26]

25. See Couper et al. (2017) for a review of potential quality concerns that arise with mobile web-based surveys.

26. A related concern is over whether responses might reflect experimenter demand effects, wherein participants shade their answers towards what they perceive to be the survey's objective. There are various reasons why we view this as unlikely to be a major problem in our current setting. The information narratives that trade is beneficial for either jobs or prices actually induce a pro-protectionist response, contrary to the anticipated direction of any experimenter demand effects. There are also no monetary stakes that are conditioned on specific responses being given. See also de Quidt et al. (2018) who present evidence that experimenter demand effects are relatively small.

5.2 Effects of Baseline Treatments

We start by analyzing the effects of the information treatments across different rounds of the survey, specifically round 1 (2018-2019) and rounds 2-4 (2020-2022). A comparison of the two sets of results helps to shed light on any common features that are robust across the independently-drawn samples before and after the outbreak of the pandemic.

Baseline Round. Table 3 presents the baseline results obtained from round 1. Relative to the control group, the group receiving the "Trade Hurts Job" treatment exhibits significantly stronger preferences for protectionist trade policies. Exposure to evidence that describes how trade has led to manufacturing job losses raises the respondents' propensity to support "More limits on imports" (Column 1), "US tariff rate increase " (Column 2), and "Higher tariffs" (Column 3), as well as to pick "More limits on imports" as one of their most-preferred policies (Column 5). At the same time, the "Trade Hurts Job" treatment lowers the likelihood of respondents supporting a policy of entering more FTAs, although this effect falls short of statistical significance (Column 4). A similar finding holds when using the principal component response in Column 6: individuals exposed to the "Trade Hurts Job" information overall display stronger support for protectionist trade policies. In terms of quantitative implications, the "Trade Hurts Job" coefficient of 0.282 in Column 6 implies a treatment effect that shifts preferences towards favoring more protection which is about 1/3 the magnitude of the effect of self-identifying as a Republican presidential candidate supporter.

In sharp contrast, we find that communicating evidence that "Trade Helps Jobs" had no significant effect on trade policy preferences.[27] Moreover, exposing participants to the "Trade Helps Prices" information leads to puzzling results: learning evidence showing imports have contributed to lower prices raises the propensity of respondents to favor more limits on imports (Column 1), supporting higher tariffs (Column 3) and to select limits on imports as a top-three preferred policy (Column 5). The coefficient estimate when using the first principal component variable in Column 6 is also statistically significant and quantitatively comparable to the effect of exposure to the "Trade Hurts Jobs" information.

The above results suggest that, contrary to expectations, receiving information on the impacts of trade can trigger increased preferences for trade protection, regardless of the positive or negative nature of the impact presented. We explore potential explanations for this puzzling finding in the next subsection by introducing variants of the "Trade Hurts

27. In early rounds, we found a "It's Technology" narrative, which discussed how automation and other technological progress have led to manufacturing job losses, lowered support for "Higher taxes on top earners", but had little clear bearing otherwise on the remaining policies.

Jobs," "Trade Helps Jobs," and "Trade Helps Prices" treatments in rounds 2-3 of our survey experiments.

Subsequent Rounds (2020-2022). In 2020-2022, we conducted additional rounds of the survey to a sample of 11,867 participants. These additional rounds of the survey enable us to examine whether individuals' responses to trade-outcome information may have varied as the pandemic disrupted the global economy and US-China trade tensions continued. In these subsequent rounds, in addition to the same treatments as round 1, we rolled out a new treatment with the "Tariff Hurts Prices" narrative discussing recent evidence concerning the new US tariffs and their impacts on prices to investigate whether participants may respond differently if the price effects of imports were presented in a "cost" manner. The surveys also included additional questions to measure how each individual's view on trade policy might have been directly affected by the pandemic and economic policy.[28]

As shown in Table 2 which compares the unconditional means of expressed policy preferences in 2018-2019, 2020, 2021, and 2022, the different rounds display broadly similar patterns in terms of support to trade protection and other economic policy instruments. For example, the responses to "Most Preferred Policies" show a similar policy ranking, with "Higher minimum wage" consistently ranked on the top followed by "Improvement on education" and "More progressive taxes" and with "Weaken the USD" and "Exiting from FTAs" consistently ranked on the bottom. Notably, though, the support for more limits on imports rose in both the binary and ranking questions: for example, in the pre-pandemic round, 23% of the respondents ranked "More limits on foreign imports" as one of their most preferred policies, while that share increased to 27-28% in 2020-2022.

Turning to the regression analysis, Table 4 presents results when pooling the Control group with observations that received jobs-related information treatments, and the findings when pooling the Control group with respondents who received prices-related narratives instead. As discussed earlier, rounds 2 and 3 of the survey incorporate several variants of the information narratives as additional treatment groups, and so we have opted to break up the analysis in this manner to avoid cluttering a single regression with up to eight treatment dummies.

When examining the jobs-related treatment effects, we find that all the baseline results documented in 2018-2019 continue to hold broadly in 2020-2022 as shown in Table 4 (Columns 1-6). Once again, the "Trade Hurts Jobs" treatment exerts a particularly noticeable effect. Exposing participants to the "Trade Hurts Jobs" information raised their

28. The sequence of the survey also in part reflects the research process: Our findings from Round 1 prompted us to perform additional surveys both to substantiate the robustness of the initial findings, as well as to probe deeper into explanations for these patterns.

propensity to select more protectionist policies while communicating "Trade Helps Jobs" had no significant effects. Interestingly, removing the national identity of the trading partner, China, from the "Trade Hurts Jobs" information only leads to slight decreases in individuals' preferences for trade protection.

We once again replicate the puzzling finding that the "Trade Helps Prices" narrative significantly *raises* preferences for protectionism, albeit with the magnitude of this treatment effect being about half the size of that displayed in Table 3. Further, the "Tariff Hurts Prices" narrative induces a similar response to that of "Trade Helps Prices": when provided with the converse information that tariffs have hurt US consumers, participants' preferences also shift towards voicing more support for limits on imports despite the fact that that many participants believed the information affected their views on trade policy. The persistence of this finding – that narratives related to how trade would benefit goods prices nevertheless induce protectionist reactions – thus appears to be a robust empirical regularity that cannot be easily rejected as an isolated result.[29]

It would also be useful to validate the above result by examining whether the participants in these recent rounds believed that the evidence-based information indeed affected their views on trade policy. Column 7 in Table 4 shows that to be the case. When asked about the degree of agreement with the statement that the information received affected the participant's views on trade policy, the respondents exposed to the "Trade Hurts Jobs", the "Trade Helps Prices" or the "Tariff Hurts Prices" treatment all tended to agree while those receiving the "Trade Helps Jobs" treatment did not. Note that participants exposed to the "Trade Hurts Jobs", the "Trade Helps Prices", or the "Tariff Hurts Prices" treatment were also more likely to have a negative view of the impact of trade for most Americans (Column 8). [30] We have also experimented with different ways of combining the information on trade policy preferences across the individual questions, such as using an unweighted average, constructing a dummy variable equal to one if a protectionist answer was recorded on at least three of the five constituent questions, or adopting a factor analysis approach; these continue to deliver results that are very consistent with our baseline.

The results from the 2021-2022 rounds indicate that despite all the disruptions from the pandemic and ongoing trade war, respondents' trade policy responses to information remain remarkably stable. Information on manufacturing job loss from trade triggers increased preferences for trade protection, while alternative information on potential gains from trade does not lead to symmetric reactions and instead similarly raises protectionist sentiment.

29. The results from pooling rounds 2-4 are qualitatively similar to the results from running each round separately.

30. Appendix Tables 3 present additional robustness analysis based on alternative samples. For example, our results continue to hold when the regressions are run on observations from rounds 2 and 3 separately.

The protectionist preferences also cannot be alleviated by simply dropping the identity of the trading partner from the information provided; the public exhibits tendencies to pick import limits regardless of the evidence presented.[31]

Respondent Characteristics. Before moving on to the variants of the treatments, it is helpful at this juncture to briefly discuss what the regression findings in Tables 3-4 suggest about the correlation between respondent characteristics and policy preferences. We report the full set of coefficients estimated from Column 6 of Tables 3 and 4 respectively in Appendix Table 2. It appears that older individuals are more likely to support limits on imports, with the effects increasing steadily across older age bands; while we find no significant differences across gender.

Consistent with previous research, political affiliation is important for explaining support for protectionism. However, in contrast to the pattern documented for the previous decade, participants who supported the Republican candidate in the 2016 presidential election are more likely to favor import restrictions, with the opposite true for Democratic supporters (the omitted category here is respondents who indicated support for neither the Republican nor the Democratic candidate). The effect of education was not significant at the 10% level in some specifications (Column 2). Interestingly, the regression results also show that the consumption of Fox News is positively correlated with support for restrictions on imports.

We find little evidence that exposure through one's county location to the manufacturing industry affects trade policy preferences: the coefficient of the 2000s Autor et al. (2013) China import shock is imprecisely estimated. Being a county with a lower college-educated share or employed in the agriculture and manufacturing sectors had a positive correlation with preferences for import restrictions. Note too that the "randomization order" variable was also consistently negative and often statistically significant, pointing to the usefulness of the randomized response order as a design feature.

5.3 Additional Information Treatments

In this subsection, we explore how various variants of information treatments, starting with a set of mixed information treatments providing evidence on both the gains and losses from trade in alternative orders, may affect the responses.

Mixed Information Treatments First, while the "Trade Helps Jobs" information exerts no significant effect on respondents when presented independently, could it help mitigate the effect of the opposite narrative? How would individuals respond to a balanced set of information?

31. This finding constitutes contrast to studies focusing on the role of framing, for example, Rodriguez et al. (2021) who find negative framing of trade raises protectionist tendency, but positive framing has zero effect.

In Panel A of Table 5, we hence evaluate the effects of providing both the "Trade Hurts Jobs" and "Trade Helps Jobs" treatments, in alternative ordering. We find that exposure to the "Trade Helps Jobs" information after learning "Trade Hurts Jobs" weakly diminishes respondents' protectionist responses. Interestingly, exposure to the "Trade Hurts Jobs" information after being communicated "Trade Helps Jobs" contributes to a similar likelihood of selecting "More limits on imports" as receiving only the "Trade Hurts Jobs" narrative. One interpretation of these findings is that the ordering of the information may play a role in individuals' response to information and the "Trade Helps Jobs" narrative can potentially help to counteract the effect of the preceding, negative narrative. It is interesting to notice in Column (2) that individuals who receive mixed treatments also tend to express a lower level of confidence in their beliefs. This result suggests that being informed of both the positive and negative effects of trade lowers one's certainty about the net impact of trade, which may explain the corresponding less protectionist response.

Sans "Cheaper" from the Price Narratives A concern that may arise in interpreting reactions to the "Trade Helps Prices" information is that participants may associate the phrase "cheap" with "low quality" and respond negatively to the evidence on lower prices. We hence adapted the baseline treatment by replacing references to "availability of cheaper goods" with "increased availability of goods". Since our baseline narratives center on the impact of trade with China, we also explore whether removing the national identity from the information treatment may affect individual trade policy preferences. To this end, we provided an adapted version of "Trade Hurts Jobs" and "Trade Helps Prices" treatments that exclude the mention of "China" from otherwise identical information, which we label as the "sans China" treatments, (Panel B, Table 5). Again, we find that the adapted language exerted similar effects on respondents' expressed preferences for trade protection.

Overall, looking across the above variants of the survey treatments, two takeaways stand out. First, the "Trade Hurts Jobs" treatment appears to have a particularly robust ability to shift respondents towards favoring more trade protection. This effect may be partially counteracted when the individuals are presented with a balanced set of information describing both the job losses and gains from imports. Second, the protectionist reactions to the "Trade Helps Prices" treatment are not sensitive to the choice of specific wording used to convey the price benefits.

5.4 Attention and Comprehension

Another concern that may arise in interpreting the documented responses so far is the degree of attention and comprehension that respondents actually exhibited as they completed the

survey. Could the unanticipated response to the "Trade Helps" narratives have been caused by confusion about the information? We investigate below the respondents' ability to recall information across treatment groups and the role of attention.

Recall Information. Table 6 presents the end-of-survey recollection of treatment information. The regressions are run on the set of respondents who received no information treatment (the control group), those who received the jobs-related treatments, and those who received the prices-related treatments. Despite the length of the survey, respondents, on average, appeared to be able to recall the basic content of the information, that is, whether the survey they received contained information "about jobs", "about prices", or "others" and the probability of correctly recalling information did not vary across treatments. There is no evidence of systematic confusion about the "Prices" vs. "jobs" narratives. Further, as shown in Columns 3-4 of Table 6, respondents who were able to correctly recall the information were driving the information treatment effects, expressing stronger preferences for trade protection regardless of the information received. This suggests that the adverse response to the positive trade narrative is unlikely to be driven by participants' misunderstanding of the treatment.[32]

Attention. Nonetheless, we show in Table 7 that attention does matter. In particular, as shown in Column 1, respondents spending a longer duration on the survey were more likely to recall the nature of the information correctly. Further, among respondents that spent above-median or top-quintile attention on the information, protectionist responses to the "Trade Helps Jobs", "Trade Helps Prices", or "Tariff Hurts Prices" information were no longer significant. This can be seen in Columns 2-4 where we limit the sample to those that took below-median, above-median, and top-quintile treatment duration, respectively. Respondents with a greater treatment duration appeared to have not only better comprehended, but also much less adversely responded to, all the different variants of the gains from trade information, while at the same time expressing more support for protectionism in reaction to the "Trade Hurts Jobs" information.

These results suggest that lack of comprehension does not appear to be the driving force behind the documented responses to information; however, greater attention during the consumption of information could potentially induce responses that are in closer alignment with the information rather than existing priors. Time-intensive information treatments would be needed to effectively communicate the benefits of trade, especially when the information

32. Results are robust to including a dummy variable for whether the respondent was shown a follow-up "reasons" question, which could have a reminder effect. textcolorredAppendix Table 5 presents summary statistics on the end-of-survey information recollection.

deviates from the individual's prior beliefs.[33] In the next section, we turn to alternative mechanisms that may help explain the consistent preferences for trade protection, irrespective of the information treatments.

6 Exploring the Mechanisms

If the respondents understand the information, why do both the "Trade Hurts Jobs" and "Trade Helps Prices" treatments provoke similar protectionist responses? In order to shed light on this question, we seek to explore potential mechanisms underlying the documented effects including the roles of economic interests, social and political concerns, and behavioral factors. We also investigate in depth the rationales provided by the respondents themselves, in particular, the roles of jobs and perceptions with regard to the largest trading partner, China.

6.1 Economic and Non-economic Characteristics

We start by augmenting the previous regression analysis (1) with interaction terms between the "Trade Hurts Jobs"/"Trade Helps Prices" dummies and respondent characteristics. In particular, we estimate the following equation:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{1}(Policy_i) &= \sum_{b=1}^{B} \alpha_b \, \mathbf{1}(Treatment_i = b) \times x_i \\ &\quad + \sum_{b=1}^{B} \beta_b \mathbf{1}(Treatment_i = b) + \gamma X_i + \epsilon_i \end{aligned} \tag{2}$$

where $x_i \in X_i$. The objective here is to explore channels through which the "Trade Hurts Jobs" narrative might be operating in influencing support for trade policies to the extent that these mechanisms can be reflected in or proxied by respondent characteristics x_i.

We focus on several key potential motivations of policy preferences which include: (a) economic self-interest, such as those derived from personal exposure to economic outcomes of trade (via industry of employment, local import penetration), the respondent's education level, and household income; (b) sociotropic perceptions, such as those regarding the distri-

33. Round 2 of the survey took place during the early months of the Covid-19 pandemic and also overlapped with political events related to the Black Lives Matter movement. Appendix Table 6 explores whether this could have affected the attention of survey participants. We control here for a county-level measure of Safegraph individual mobility that is constructed by the data provider from cell phone signal data as a proxy for the severity of local Covid-19 lockdowns. We also control for a measure of county-level Black Lives Matter protests. Neither of these controls has a significant effect on preferences over trade policy, nor do they affect the information treatment effect results.

bution of income inequality, trust in government, and the effect of trade; (c) identity politics such as political positions and views; and (d) behavioral factors, in particular, the degree of loss aversion. Note, however, that these categories are certainly not mutually exclusive; some variables such as education and sociotropic views, such as inflation expectations, for example, may influence individual preferences through multiple mechanisms.

Figure 1 reports the level effect coefficients of respondent characteristics on preferences for protection while Figure 2, the results from interaction specifications run on both the baseline sample and the sample of respondents that spent above-median duration on treatments. For brevity, we present estimates of (2) from OLS regressions using the first principal component measure of preferences for protection as the dependent variable so that the magnitudes of the coefficients plotted can be directly compared.

Economic Self-interest

Exposure to Import Competition. We first analyze whether exposure to adverse effects of import competition due to one's industry of employment or geographic location might lead to resonance with the "Trade Hurts Jobs" information. In particular, based on classical trade theories (such as Stolper-Samuelson), respondents working in the manufacturing sector or living in areas with greater import penetration might, in principle, be more responsive to the "Trade Hurts Jobs" treatment and by extension, be less receptive to information about the benefits of trade.

We test this hypothesis by interacting the respective treatment dummies with an indicator variable for whether the respondent is from the manufacturing sector. (Appendix Table 7 Column 1), and with the Autor et al. (2013) measure of China import penetration during the 2000s (Column 2), respectively. As shown in the table and Figure 2, we do not find significant evidence supporting this channel. Respondent's employment in manufacturing or exposure to Chinese import competition explains neither overall preferences for trade protection nor reactions to any of the treatments (jobs in Figure 2.A or prices in Figure 2.B).

Education. Might education temper protectionist tendencies? In Column 3 of Appendix Table 7, we explore this possibility by introducing an interaction term between the treatments and a dummy for whether the respondent was a college graduate. We find education to play no significant role in both the level of protectionist tendency and reactions to information.[34]

34. In the first run of the survey in July 2018, we also included a "It's not Trade, it's Technology" narrative that presented the argument that "Technological advances in recent decades, such as computerization and automation, have tended to favor skilled workers while replacing some jobs that used to be performed by unskilled workers." We did not find statistically significant effects with this information treatment and, given budget constraints, decided to omit it from subsequent survey runs to focus on the jobs- and prices-related treatments.

Income. We also examine additional proxies for economic self-interests including, for example, household income and unemployment status. The results in Appendix Table 7 show that while respondent characteristics that in principle indirectly capture trade exposure via industry, location, and education group do not appear to reinforce the ability of the information treatments to move preferences in a protectionist direction, more direct markers of exposure measured by household income and reported effects of NAFTA are associated with the degree of protectionist reactions. Respondents with lower household income and reporting negative effects of NAFTA tend to respond more strongly and negatively to trade narratives.

Sociotropic Perceptions

Income Inequality and Inflation Concerns. In addition to economic self-interests, another category that might play a potential role in people's policy preferences is sociotropic concerns. One hypothesis is that participants with stronger concerns regarding how big a problem inequality is in the US today may exhibit more willingness to adopt protectionist policies to address this problem. As seen in Appendix Table 8, participants more concerned about income inequality are less likely to favor protectionist policies; instead, they tend to rank alternative economic policies such as more progressive taxes and a higher minimum wage higher on their policy choices (available on request). Participants concerned with inflation were also more willing to restrict trade at a 10% significance level. The interaction effects with the different treatments, however, are not significant.

Trust in Government. Another hypothesis on preferences for trade protection (especially relative to alternative policy instruments) concerns trust in the government. Kuziemko et al. (2015) show that low trust in government can explain the lack of responsiveness in individuals' preference for redistribution policies even when made aware of the severity of income inequality. This motivates us to examine whether trust in governments may have affected protectionist tendencies, irrespective of information treatments. The results in Appendix Table 8 offer support for the above hypothesis. We find that less trust in the government is associated with overall weaker preferences for the use of trade policy, but does not affect reactions to information treatments.

Pessimistic Views and Domestic Preference. We also consider how other types of perceptions such as dissatisfaction with the US Job Market and confidence in the outlook for future generations born into their community may explain reactions to the information. The results show that those more dissatisfied with the US job market and more pessimistic about the future of their children tend to support less trade protection, but again do not display heterogeneous responses to information received. In contrast, individuals that exhibit willingness

to pay more for domestic brands prefer more trade protection, especially when presented the "tariff hurts prices" narrative.

Loss Aversion

After exploring the potential effects of economic and sociotropic considerations, we next examine the role of behavioral factors, specifically that of loss aversion in explaining the lack of symmetric reactions we documented earlier to the losses versus the gains from trade. As noted in the extensive literature led by the early work of Kahneman and Tversky (1984) and Kahneman et al. (1991), individuals often place an asymmetric value on losses than gains: the disutility of giving up an object is perceived to be greater than the utility associated with acquiring it. Freund and Ozden (2008) show theoretically that loss aversion and reference dependence can be important in shaping people's preferences over trade policy, leading to a deviation from free trade that favors loss-making industries. Could loss aversion help explain the unexpected responses to the "Trade Helps Prices" treatment?

To answer this question, we build on existing studies such as Kahneman et al. (1991) using lab experiments to measure individuals' level of loss aversion and include three questions in the survey to assess the participant's preferences to avoid losses relative to acquiring equivalent gains.[35] In line with the existing evidence, we document an asymmetry in people's value of avoiding losses versus obtaining gains. Most respondents expressed stronger preferences for avoiding the additional surcharge than getting an equivalent discount and weaker willingness to pay than a willingness to accept. In Appendix Table 9, we show that while this loss aversion does not lead to different responses to the "Trade Hurts Jobs" treatment, it helps explain the protectionist response to the "Trade Helps Prices" treatment (see also Figure 2.B). Consistent with the hypothesis put forward in Freund and Ozden (2008), individuals exhibiting stronger degrees of loss aversion are more likely to ignore the price gains of imports by preferring more limits on imports.

Identity Politics

So far, we have found limited explanations from economic self-interests and sociotropic perceptions for the estimated treatment effects; could the findings then be driven by the role of information in reinforcing or even provoking one's prior political beliefs? Instead of being

35. Specifically, the following questions are included to measure the willingness to avoid paying versus the willingness to be paid: (i) which of the following would you prefer on your monthly cell phone statement: Avoiding an additional surcharge of $100 vs Getting a discount of $100? (ii) suppose you are given a cell phone with a market value of around $500 - please choose one of the options below to indicate the price you would be willing to pay if you had to purchase the cell phone yourself, and (iii) suppose you are given a cell phone with a market value around $500 - please choose one of the options below to indicate the price you would be willing to accept if you were to sell the cell phone.

swayed by the evidence, the respondents may simply react to the information following their priors. To examine this hypothesis and proxy for political priors, we use the information on whether the respondent supported the Republican or Democratic presidential candidate in the 2016 election and the political leaning of the newspapers consumed by the respondent. As reported in Appendix Table 9 and Figure 2, we find that first, respondents who supported the Republican candidate in 2016 exhibit significantly stronger preferences for trade protection and that support for Republicans appears to accentuate the information treatment effects associated with the jobs-related treatments. On the other hand, respondents who self-report supporting the Democratic presidential candidate in 2016 are less likely to voice a preference for protection after being presented with information that "Trade Hurts Jobs" or with information that trade has beneficial effects on prices (Column 3).

A possible interpretation of the results is that information on trade outcomes, irrespective of gains or losses, tends to amplify and even provoke the trade policy preferences of respondents with a given prior derived from their political identity.[36]

While the above mechanisms may certainly overlap and interact with one another, the findings highlight the particular importance of non-economic factors, especially that of loss aversion and identity politics, in explaining whether and how information might shift individuals' preferences for trade policies. Economic self-interests and the economic outcomes of trade as long emphasized in classical trade theories do not appear as the driving force leading individuals more or less elastic to the information. Providing evidence-based information in the context of our experiment can trigger differential and sometimes unexpected reactions by reinforcing or provoking priors, especially those more averse to losses and right-leaning.

The patterns unveiled are consistent with prior-biased belief updating, a form of confirmation bias that has been documented in recent behavioral economics literature (Charness and Dave, 2017; Benjamin, 2019).[37] Information such as the "Trade Helps" narrative that is at odds with one's prior disposition can lead to an updating of preferences in the opposite direction, i.e., away from free trade, amplifying prior protectionist tendencies.[38]

36. This finding that information received can reinforce prior beliefs stemming from one's political identity echoes Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005) and Chopra et al. (2022), who push the logic further to draw out implications for individual's demand for news and information sources.

37. See, also, Soroka (2006) on asymmetric response to good vs. bad economic information; Barrera et al. (2020) on fact-checking.

38. Another related interpretation that has been noted in the behavioral economics literature is information avoidance (Goldman et al., 2017); however, our finding that participants responded significantly to the treatments relative to the control group suggests that participants did not simply avoid information.

6.2 Why Limit Imports? Jobs, America, and China

In the remainder of this section, we continue the search for rationales that motivated the preferences for import restrictions by exploiting directly the explanations respondents provided when asked in the last section of the survey reasons for choosing "More limits on imports" despite being exposed to information on the positive effects of trade.

Table 8 reports the summary statistics on respondents' agreement with a specific reason for picking "More limits on imports" as a top-three policy choice. We find that first, participants receiving the "Trade Helps Prices" and "Tariff Hurts Prices" treatments are not less unpersuaded. In fact, they are more likely to disagree with the statement that "they picked more limits on imports because they were not persuaded." This finding again confirms that the protectionist response to the "Trade Helps Prices" treatment documented earlier is not driven by the lack of persuasion in this particular treatment. Similarly, participants informed with "Trade Helps Jobs" are not less convinced than participants told "Trade Hurts Jobs".[39]

Instead, "concerned about imports from China" and "imports often compete for US jobs" were the top two reasons given by the respondents, with the highest agreement scores consistently across treatments. This result suggests that respondents' prior beliefs and concerns about China and US jobs were the main driving forces for their expressed preferences for trade protection.

Since our information treatments have centered on the impact of trade with China, we also explore whether removing the national identity from the information may reshape trade policy preferences and concerns. To this end, we provided an adapted version of "Trade Hurts Jobs" and "Trade Helps Prices" treatments that exclude the mention of "China" from otherwise identical information, which we label as the "sans China" treatments. Table 8 shows that while excluding the mention of "China" in the treatments can slightly lower the agreement scores received by "concerned about imports from China" and "imports often compete for US jobs," they remain as the top two reasons for picking trade protectionist policies.

Appendix Table 10 confirms the above patterns by running ordered-logit regressions on the respondents' reasoning across different treatment groups. The dependent variable in each column is an ordered categorical variable for the degree of agreement with the respective reason, with 1 being "Strongly Disagree" and 5 being "Strongly Agree". Similar to Table 8, we find that respondents are most likely to cite "Competition with jobs" and

39. Another hypothesis is that distrust in the research findings of economists could have triggered protectionist responses (e.g., Cheng and Hsiaw 2022). However, we do not view this as the main driver of preferences for protection in our sample, given that other reasons are cited more intensely compared to lack of persuasion.

"Concerns about imports from China" as their top reasons for preferring trade protection. Comparing respondents receiving information without the mention of China with others shows that including China in the "Trade Helps" information raises the respondents' scores given to "Concerns about imports from China" and "National security" relative to not being persuaded.

This finding is also reflected in the open-ended questions where the respondents are asked to freely express their reasons for choosing trade protection. As shown in the upper panel of Figure 3 drawn from respondents' comments, the top phrases include "American Jobs," "Made in the USA," "America First," "Self Reliance," and "China." Concerns about jobs, America First, and China appeared most frequently as the respondents' rationales for favoring trade restrictions.

The concerns over China become even more pronounced when the respondents are asked to select a country to impose additional tariffs if they choose to do so. As shown in the lower panel of Figure 3, respondents overwhelmingly select China, followed by Russia, as the target of extra tariffs.[40] Appendix Table 11 suggests that the patterns that emerged from respondents' expressions do not vary significantly across treatments.[41]

While concerns about China are not conditional on the information presented, we document political heterogeneity in the importance of such concerns in driving trade policy preferences. As shown in Figure 4 and Appendix Table 13, respondents who supported the Republican presidential candidate were more likely to cite China as their top reason for picking import limits whereas respondents who voted for the Democratic presidential candidate tended to be influenced by other reasons.

These findings indicate that individuals' preferences over trade policies are not a simple, symmetric function of the expected gains and losses from trade. Instead, they are shaped by individual perceptions and priorities on jobs, national interests, and great power competition, which in turn are influenced by their political identity. Information that focuses solely on communicating trade benefits is unlikely to succeed unless it addresses broader geopolitical concerns.

40. For completeness, Appendix Figure 2 presents word clouds comparing the occurrence of "China" in the written responses of the Jobs versus prices treatments (top panel) and the occurrence of "Jobs" in the with and sans China treatments (bottom panel). The figures suggest similar patterns.

41. Consistent with these results, Appendix Table 12 compares the effects of "with-China" and "sans-China" treatments on the probability of choosing trade protection policy and shows that the explicit mention of China, or its exclusion, once again, shows no significant difference in treatment effects.

7 Discussions and Conclusion

Understanding how evidence-based information might shape individuals' attitudes towards globalization and preferences over trade policies is critical, as economists have traditionally viewed trade policy preferences as being driven by economic self-interest, with little analysis on how the information that the public is exposed to can, in turn, affect views towards trade. We answer the question by developing and administering a series of survey experiments in 2018-2022 that contain randomized information treatments with concise summaries of evidence established by economic researchers on the gains and losses from trade.

Our results suggest that a "Trade Hurts Jobs" narrative shifts policy preferences towards being more protectionist, with an elasticity equivalent to a third of the effect of self-identified political position. In contrast, reactions to the job-gains-from-trade narrative are highly asymmetric and display even similar protectionist tendencies. More strikingly, exposing participants to the "Trade Helps Prices" or "Tariff Hurts Prices" information also induces protectionist choices, with a magnitude quantitatively comparable to the effect of the "Trade Hurts Jobs" narrative. These findings are robust throughout the five-year period of the survey despite the unprecedented disruptions and fast-evolving political and economic movements and even when the narratives exclude the identity of the trading partner, China. Taken together, our findings on these information treatment effects underscore the challenges of communicating the benefits of trade to the general public through the provision of evidence-based information.

When exploring underlying mechanisms, the analysis points to the particular role of interactions between information and individual priors, including perceptions of the economic impact of trade, political identity, as well as concerns over trade with China. Concerns over China and jobs, in particular, have been shown to act as key factors in individuals' preferences for import limits regardless of the narrative presented. These results suggest that individuals' preferences over trade policies are not formed in isolation from the identity of the key countries that the U.S. is trading with Instead, special considerations related to geopolitics that go beyond strictly economic rationales appear to come into play and can provoke the expression of policy preferences in the opposite direction of economic incentives.

Our research sheds light on whether the provision of short evidence-based messaging can help to steer public preferences towards trade policy. The research design allows us to examine the relative ability of pro- versus anti-globalization narratives to gain traction with the general public. This could in turn inform the manner in which public education and messaging could be formulated in order to more effectively communicate the benefits and costs of globalization to the public. Furthermore, if preferences for trade policies can

be steered with simple information treatments in either intended or unintended directions, this would open avenues for rethinking the role that information and communication ought to play in the political economy of trade policy formation. The analysis suggests that public messaging that focuses solely on communicating trade benefits is unlikely to succeed when individuals possess opposite priors unless the messaging addresses broader geopolitical concerns.

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A Appendix

A.1 Survey Treatments

The following preamble is presented at the start of each of the information treatment narratives (excluding the control group).

> How have globalization and imports affected workers and households? Economic researchers have been studying this issue.

"Trade Hurts Jobs" narrative. Based on Autor, Dorn and Hanson (AER 2013):

> A line of recent research has shown that the United States substantially increased its imports from China, after China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001. This was a major force behind the fall in U.S. employment in the manufacturing sector, as the figure below shows. This led to weak wage growth for the middle- and low-income workers who used to hold these manufacturing jobs.



FIGURE 1. IMPORT PENETRATION RATIO FOR US IMPORTS FROM CHINA (*left scale*), AND SHARE OF US WORKING-AGE POPULATION EMPLOYED IN MANUFACTURING (*right scale*)

"Trade Helps Jobs". Based on Caliendo, Dvorkin and Parro (2019):

> A line of recent research has shown that the United States substantially increased its imports from China, after China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001. This enabled the U.S. to specialize more in the service sectors in which

it is particularly productive, helping to increase the number of jobs in the U.S. economy. The figure below shows that the rise in total jobs over the last decades was substantial.



Starting in 2020, two additional treatments were included that mix the "Trade Hurts Jobs" and "Trade Helps Jobs" narratives:

- "Trade Hurts Helps Jobs": "Trade Hurts Jobs" is presented first, followed by "Trade Helps Jobs". The narratives are prefaced respectively by: "On the one hand, a line of recent research..." and "On the other hand, another line of recent research...". (The figures from both narratives were included.)

- "Trade Helps Hurts Jobs": This is analogous to "Trade Hurts Helps Jobs", except that the order of the "Trade Hurts Jobs" and "Trade Helps Jobs" narratives are reversed.

Starting in 2021, two additional treatments were included that excluded the word "China" from the narratives:

- "Trade Hurts Helps Jobs sans China": A line of recent research has shown that the United States substantially increased its imports from the rest of the world, as a result of globalization. This was a major force behind the fall in U.S. employment in the manufacturing sector, as the figure below shows. This led to weak wage growth for the middle- and low-income workers who used to hold these manufacturing jobs.

- "Trade Hurts Helps Jobs sans China": A line of recent research has shown that the United States substantially increased its imports from the rest of the world, as a result

of globalization. This enabled the U.S. to specialize more in the service sectors in which it is particularly productive, helping to increase the number of jobs in the U.S. economy. The figure below shows that the rise in total jobs over the last decades was substantial.

"Trade Helps Prices":

A line of recent research has shown that the United States substantially increased its imports from China, after China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001. This was a major force behind the availability of cheaper goods, which benefited Americans. As imports from China increased, the prices of durable goods (computers, electrical products, furniture, etc.) and of nondurable goods such as apparel all saw declines, as the figure below shows.



Import Penetration Ratio for US Imports from China (*left scale*),
US Prices for Durables or Apparel (*right scale*)

Two variants of the "Trade Helps Prices" treatment were included in the survey starting in 2020:

- "Trade Helps Prices sans Cheaper". The sentence: "This was a major force behind the availability of cheaper goods, which benefited Americans." was replaced by: "This was a major force behind the increased availability of goods, which benefited Americans." This wording was intended to replace the adjective "cheaper", which could have triggered negative views towards imports due to the possible association of "cheaper" with imported goods being of "low quality".

- "Trade Helps Prices sans China". Any references to "China" were removed from the narrative, as follows: "A line of recent research has shown that the United States substantially increased its imports from the rest of the world, as a result of globalization. This was a major force behind the availability of cheaper goods, which benefited Americans. As imports from the rest of the world increased, the prices of durable goods (computers, electrical products, furniture, etc.) and of nondurable goods such as apparel all saw declines, as the figure below shows."

"Tariff Hurts Prices":

A line of recent research has shown that the tariffs in 2018 have raised the cost of living in the United States. Over the course of 2018, the U.S. imposed tariffs on approximately $400 billion of imports, particularly from China. This led to significant increases in U.S. prices of tariff-related goods, as the figure below shows. It is estimated that this increase in prices lowered U.S. real income by $1.4 billion per month.



Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics. Core goods excludes food and energy; tariff-related goods prices includes laundry equipment and other appliances, furniture and bedding, housekeeping supplies, window and floor coverings, auto parts and bicycles.

Table 1
Summary Statistics: Respondent Characteristics by Survey Round

SURVEY:	Round 1, 2018-19 (N=2,277)	Round 2, 2020 (N=6,009)	Round 3, 2021 (N=4,058)	Round 4, 2022 (N=6,005)
Biodata				
Gender: Male	0.49 [0.50]	0.47 [0.50]	0.49 [0.50]	0.48 [0.50]
Gender: Female	0.51 [0.50]	0.52 [0.50]	0.51 [0.50]	0.52 [0.50]
Age: Average (approx.)	47.55 [16.78]	45.45 [16.61]	46.55 [16.69]	46.45 [16.78]
Race: White	0.61 [0.49]	0.67 [0.47]	0.62 [0.48]	0.62 [0.49]
Race: African-American	0.11 [0.32]	0.13 [0.33]	0.12 [0.32]	0.12 [0.33]
Race: Hispanic	0.17 [0.37]	0.13 [0.34]	0.18 [0.38]	0.17 [0.38]
Born in US?	0.92 [0.27]	0.92 [0.27]	0.91 [0.28]	0.92 [0.28]
Socio-Economic Characteristics				
Household Income: Average $ (approx.)	58,196 [47,585]	64,886 [54,093]	62,010 [49,462]	58,785 [45,827]
Education: Average years (approx.)	11.81 [4.91]	11.56 [4.86]	11.71 [4.87]	11.70 [4.86]
Employment Status: Not in Labor Force	0.40 [0.49]	0.39 [0.49]	0.39 [0.49]	0.39 [0.49]
Employment Status: Unemployed	0.10 [0.30]	0.11 [0.32]	0.10 [0.30]	0.10 [0.30]
Employment Status: Employed	0.50 [0.50]	0.50 [0.50]	0.50 [0.50]	0.51 [0.50]
Employment Sector: Manufacturing	0.08 [0.26]	0.09 [0.28]	0.07 [0.26]	0.07 [0.26]
Employment Sector: Services	0.39 [0.49]	0.36 [0.48]	0.39 [0.49]	0.40 [0.49]
Student?	0.03 [0.17]	0.04 [0.20]	0.04 [0.20]	0.03 [0.17]
Loss aversion (Scale: 1 to 5)	---	3.11 [1.47]	3.07 [1.50]	3.06 [1.50]
Baseline Socio-Political Attributes				
Last Presidential election: Supported Dem	0.41 [0.49]	0.41 [0.49]	0.49 [0.50]	0.44 [0.50]
Last Presidential election: Supported Rep	0.34 [0.47]	0.36 [0.48]	0.33 [0.47]	0.34 [0.47]
Trust in government? (Scale: 1 to 5)	2.50 [1.05]	2.79 [1.13]	2.69 [1.11]	2.55 [1.08]
Impact of NAFTA on family (Scale: 1 to 5)	3.16 [0.90]	3.35 [0.90]	3.31 [0.87]	3.11 [0.91]
Children born into better life? (Scale: 1 to	3.07 [1.13]	3.23 [1.10]	3.16 [1.15]	2.95 [1.14]
Satisfied with health of US job market?	0.48 [0.50]	0.35 [0.48]	0.40 [0.49]	0.41 [0.49]
Willing to pay more for US brand?	0.59 [0.49]	0.65 [0.48]	0.63 [0.48]	0.61 [0.49]
Inequality in US a problem? (Scale: 1 to 4	3.01 [0.96]	2.96 [0.95]	2.97 [0.96]	2.99 [0.94]
Inflation in US a problem? (Scale: 1 to 4)	---	---	---	3.42 [0.80]
News consumption patterns				
Number of days per week (approx.)	5.02 [2.47]	5.29 [2.34]	5.01 [2.43]	4.87 [2.52]
Main tv source: Broadcast tv	0.29 [0.45]	0.26 [0.44]	0.25 [0.43]	0.26 [0.44]
Main tv source: CNN, MSNBC	0.17 [0.37]	0.21 [0.40]	0.20 [0.40]	0.16 [0.37]
Main tv source: Fox News	0.16 [0.36]	0.17 [0.38]	0.15 [0.36]	0.16 [0.37]
Location Characteristics				
Share with college and above (age>=25)	0.30 [0.11]	0.31 [0.12]	0.31 [0.11]	0.30 [0.10]
Autor-Dorn-Hanson measure for 2000s	2.56 [1.82]	2.57 [2.11]	2.54 [1.77]	2.61 [2.02]
Share of manufacturing in employment	0.16 [0.11]	0.16 [0.11]	0.16 [0.11]	0.16 [0.11]
Urban?	0.86 [0.35]	0.87 [0.33]	0.86 [0.35]	0.85 [0.35]
Survey Characteristics				
Duration to complete (secs.)	727 [1,513]	912 [2,292]	888 [1,015]	897 [925]
Treatment duration	47 [66]	28 [84]	28 [58]	26 [64]
Mobile device?	0.61 [0.49]	0.70 [0.46]	0.58 [0.49]	0.54 [0.50]

Notes: Mean values reported, with standard deviations in brackets. For respondent age, household income, and frequency of news consumpton, this is approximated by a weighted average of the midpoint values of the response option bins, using the share of respondents picking each bin as weights. For respondent years of education, an analogous weighted average is taken that assigns 6 years to "High school or less", 14 years to "Some college", 16 years to "College graduate", and 18 years to "Post graduate". The average treatment duration is longer in Round 1 due to a longer treatment preamble (which was

Table 2
Expressed Policy Preferences: Respondent Shares

SURVEY:	Round 1, 2018-19 (N=2,277)	Round 2, 2020 (N=6,009)	Round 3, 2021 (N=4,058)	Round 4, 2022 (N=6,005)
Do you support placing more limits on imports?	0.57 [0.49]	0.62 [0.49]	0.59 [0.49]	0.58 [0.49]
Would you support an increase in the US tariff rate	0.28 [0.45]	0.25 [0.43]	0.25 [0.43]	0.32 [0.47]
Prefer: Higher tariff rates on foreign countries?	0.44 [0.50]	0.50 [0.50]	0.47 [0.50]	0.48 [0.50]
Prefer: More progressive taxes?	0.68 [0.46]	0.65 [0.48]	0.68 [0.47]	0.68 [0.47]
Would you support signing more FTAs?	0.68 [0.47]	0.65 [0.48]	0.65 [0.48]	0.64 [0.48]
Would you support a minimum wage?	0.78 [0.41]	0.80 [0.40]	0.74 [0.44]	0.78 [0.42]
Most Preferred Policies (pick 3 out of 8)				
More limits on foreign imports	0.23 [0.42]	0.27 [0.44]	0.28 [0.45]	0.28 [0.45]
Exiting from FTAs	0.13 [0.34]	0.12 [0.33]	0.13 [0.34]	0.12 [0.33]
More limits on immigration	0.34 [0.47]	0.31 [0.46]	0.37 [0.48]	0.35 [0.48]
Weaken the USD	0.07 [0.26]	0.09 [0.29]	0.09 [0.28]	0.08 [0.28]
Higher taxes on top income earners	0.51 [0.50]	0.46 [0.50]	0.50 [0.50]	0.53 [0.50]
Higher minimum wage	0.61 [0.49]	0.60 [0.49]	0.56 [0.50]	0.61 [0.49]
More unemployment benefits	0.30 [0.46]	0.34 [0.47]	0.29 [0.45]	0.30 [0.46]
Improve education and worker training	0.59 [0.49]	0.49 [0.50]	0.52 [0.50]	0.56 [0.50]

Notes: Values reported are equal to the share of respondents pooled across the control and all treatment groups, who expressed a preference for the policy in question; standard deviations are in brackets. The shares for "Prefer: Higher tariff rates on foreign countries?" and "Prefer: More progressive taxes?" do not sum to one, as respondents were allowed to select both policies.

Table 3
Effect of Information Treatments on Preferences Towards Trade Policy
(Round 1, 2018-2019)

Trade Policy Questions:	(1) More limits on imports	(2) US tariff rate increase	(3) Support higher tariff	(4) Support more FTAs	(5) Most Pref.: More limits on Imports	(6) First principal component
	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	OLS
Treatment dummies:						
Trade Hurts Jobs	0.060*	0.045*	0.083***	-0.046	0.080***	0.282***
	[0.032]	[0.026]	[0.032]	[0.030]	[0.024]	[0.076]
Trade Helps Jobs	0.007	0.033	0.064	0.017	0.040	0.135
	[0.035]	[0.034]	[0.041]	[0.032]	[0.027]	[0.098]
Trade Helps Prices	0.057*	0.018	0.071*	-0.007	0.069**	0.211**
	[0.034]	[0.030]	[0.039]	[0.032]	[0.028]	[0.089]
Most Pref., Randomization Order					-0.003	0.003
					[0.003]	[0.011]
Last Pres. Election:	-0.042	-0.043*	-0.043	0.091***	-0.064***	-0.259***
Supported Democrat	[0.029]	[0.022]	[0.026]	[0.027]	[0.019]	[0.075]
Last Pres. Election:	0.224***	0.147***	0.219***	-0.034	0.092***	0.728***
Supported Republican	[0.030]	[0.028]	[0.029]	[0.029]	[0.023]	[0.081]
Individual, county, week controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	2,277	2,277	2,277	2,277	2,277	2,277
(Pseudo) R-squared	0.0970	0.103	0.0742	0.0746	0.0783	0.183

Notes: Based on the Round 1 (2018-2019) sample; comprising respondents in the "Control" group who received no information treatment (the omitted category), as well as those who received the "Trade Hurts Jobs", "Trade Helps Jobs" and "Trade Helps Prices" treatments. The dependent variable in Columns 1-4 is an indicator equal to 1 if the respondent indicated support for the policy in a directly-posed question; that in Column 5 is an indicator equal to 1 if the respondent identified "More limits on imports" among his/her three "Most preferred" out of the list of eight policies; while that in Column 6 is the first principal component constructed to be increasing in preferences for more limits on trade. The controls included (but not reported) are: individual dummies for gender, age group, race, level of studies, household income bins, employment status (including broad sector), survey answered on mobile device, BEA region of birth (including foreign-born category), frequency following current affairs, and news program source; county controls for share of college educated, ADH exposure to China imports (2000-2007), manufacturing share of employment, urban dummy, missing county information dummy; survey response week dummies. The "Most Pref., Randomization Order" variable is the rank order in which "More Limits on Imports" was presented among the eight policy options to the respondent in question. Columns 1-5 report marginal effects from logit regressions, evaluated with the treatment dummies at a base value of zero, while setting all other right-hand side controls at their in-

Table 4
Effect of Information Treatments on Preferences Towards Trade Policy
(Pooled: Round 2, 2020; Round 3, 2021; Round 4, 2022)

Trade Policy Questions:	(1) More limits on imports	(2) US tariff rate increase	(3) Support higher tariff	(4) Support more FTAs	(5) Most Pref.: More limits on Imports	(6) First principal component	(7) Did information affect views?	(8) Impact of trade for most Americans?
	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	OLS	Ordered logit	Ordered logit
Treatment dummies:								
Trade Hurts Jobs	0.091***	0.071***	0.036**	-0.038**	0.033**	0.242***	0.048***	-0.248***
	[0.017]	[0.015]	[0.017]	[0.018]	[0.015]	[0.043]	[0.015]	[0.016]
Trade Helps Jobs	0.023	0.023	0.026	-0.006	0.009	0.081*	0.030*	-0.025*
	[0.018]	[0.015]	[0.018]	[0.019]	[0.015]	[0.044]	[0.016]	[0.015]
Trade Helps Prices	0.057***	0.027*	-0.005	-0.001	0.031**	0.109***	0.028*	-0.058***
	[0.017]	[0.014]	[0.017]	[0.017]	[0.015]	[0.042]	[0.015]	[0.015]
Tariff Hurts Prices	0.040**	0.020	0.017	-0.004	0.023	0.099**	0.046***	-0.164***
	[0.017]	[0.014]	[0.017]	[0.017]	[0.016]	[0.042]	[0.016]	[0.016]
Most Pref., Randomization Order					-0.011***	-0.019***		
					[0.002]	[0.006]		
Last Pres. Election:	0.003	0.006	-0.042***	0.124***	-0.040***	-0.141***	0.093***	0.089***
Supported Democrat	[0.014]	[0.011]	[0.016]	[0.014]	[0.012]	[0.035]	[0.013]	[0.012]
Last Pres. Election:	0.193***	0.122***	0.143***	-0.037**	0.141***	0.625***	0.084***	-0.002
Supported Republican	[0.016]	[0.013]	[0.015]	[0.015]	[0.015]	[0.040]	[0.013]	[0.013]
Individual, county, week controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	9,275	9,275	9,275	9,275	9,275	9,275	9,275	9,275
(Pseudo) R-squared	0.0766	0.0801	0.0471	0.0698	0.0796	0.153	0.0488	0.0569

those who received the "Trade Hurts Jobs", "Trade Helps Jobs", "Trade Helps Prices", and "Tariff Hurts Prices" treatments. The dependent variable in Columns 1-4 is an indicator equal to 1 if the respondent indicated support for the policy in a directly-posed question; that in Column 5 is an indicator equal to 1 if the respondent identified "More limits on imports" among his/her three "Most preferred" out of the list of eight policies; that in Column 6 is the first principal component constructed to be increasing in preferences for more limits on trade; that in Column 7 is a categorical variable for degree of agreement with the statement that the information received affected one's views on trade policy (1="Strongly disagree", 5="Strongly agree"); while that in Column 8 is a categorical variable asked post-treatment on views on the impact that trade has had for most Americans (1="Extremely bad", 5="Extremely good"). The controls included (but not reported) are as listed in the Table 3 footnotes. Columns 1-5 report marginal effects from logit regressions; Columns 7 and 8 report marginal effects from ordered logit regressions, on the predicted probability that either the fourth or fifth highest ordered category is selected as the response. All marginal effects are evaluated with the treatment dummies at a base value of zero, while setting all other right-hand side controls at their in-sample mean values. Column 6 reports an OLS regression. Standard errors are clustered by respondent county, and computed where necessary by the delta method; ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.

Table 5
Other Information Treatments
(Pooled: Round 2, 2020; Round 3, 2021; Round 4, 2022)

Trade Policy Questions:	(1) First principal component	(2) Did information affect views?	(3) Impact of trade for most
	OLS	Ordered logit	Ordered logit
Panel A: Mixed Job Treatments			
Trade Hurts Jobs	0.237***	0.047***	-0.249***
	[0.043]	[0.015]	[0.016]
Trade Helps Jobs	0.074*	0.030*	-0.022
	[0.045]	[0.016]	[0.015]
Trade Hurts Helps Jobs	0.177***	0.035**	-0.093***
	[0.048]	[0.016]	[0.016]
Trade Helps Hurts Jobs	0.206***	0.043***	-0.208***
	[0.045]	[0.016]	[0.017]
Observations	8,561	8,561	8,561
(Pseudo) R-squared	0.158	0.0467	0.0584
Panel B: "Sans Cheaper" Price Treatment			
Trade Helps Prices	0.111***	0.025	-0.061***
	[0.042]	[0.015]	[0.016]
Tariff Hurts Prices	0.103**	0.045***	-0.168***
	[0.042]	[0.016]	[0.016]
Trade Helps Prices sans Cheaper	0.167***	0.015	-0.059***
	[0.049]	[0.017]	[0.017]
Observations	7,147	7,147	7,147
(Pseudo) R-squared	0.151	0.0518	0.0533
Individual, county, week, rand. order controls?	Y	Y	Y

Notes: Based on the Round 2 (2020), Round 3 (2021), and Round 4 (2022) samples, comprising respondents in the "Control" group who received no information treatment (the omitted category), as well as those who received the treatments listed in the respective panels. The dependent variable in Column 1 is the first principal component measure (from Column 6 of Table 4) constructed to be increasing in preferences for more limits on trade; that in Column 2 is a categorical variable for degree of agreement with the statement that the information received affected one's views on trade policy (1="Strongly disagree", 5="Strongly agree"); while that in Column 3 is a categorical variable asked post-treatment on views on the impact that trade has had for most Americans (1="Extremely bad", 5="Extremely good"). The controls included (but not reported) are as listed in the Table 3 footnotes, as well as Democrat and Republican dummies for the candidate supported in the last presidential election; Column 1 further includes the randomization rank order in which "More Limits on Imports" appeared in the "Most Preferred" list of 8 policies. Column 1 reports an OLS regression. Columns 2-3 report marginal effects from ordered logit regressions, on the predicted probability that either the fourth or fifth highest ordered category is selected as the response; all marginal effects are evaluated setting the initial values of the treatment dummies to zero, while setting all other right-hand side controls at their in-sample mean values. Standard errors are

Table 6
End-of-Survey Recollection of Treatment Information
(Pooled: Round 2, 2020; Round 3, 2021; Round 4, 2022)

Dependent variable:	(1) Info received on jobs? Logit	(2) Info received on prices? Logit	(3) First principal component OLS Info recall incorrect	(4) First principal component OLS Info recall correct
Trade Hurts Jobs	0.130***	-0.044***	0.086*	0.606***
	[0.018]	[0.017]	[0.051]	[0.082]
Trade Helps Jobs	0.149***	-0.062***	-0.016	0.350***
	[0.016]	[0.017]	[0.055]	[0.083]
Trade Helps Prices	-0.050***	0.139***	0.070	0.315***
	[0.015]	[0.018]	[0.061]	[0.077]
Tariff Hurts Prices	-0.056***	0.125***	0.057	0.313***
	[0.015]	[0.016]	[0.058]	[0.078]
Individual, county, week, rand. order contro	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	9,275	9,275	5,080	4,195
(Pseudo) R-squared	0.0422	0.0313	0.147	0.178

Notes: Based on the Round 2 (2020), Round 3 (2021), and Round 4 (2022) samples; comprising respondents in the "Control" group who received no information treatment (the omitted category), as well as those who received the "Trade Hurts Jobs", "Trade Helps Jobs", "Trade Helps Prices", and "Tariff Hurts Prices" treatments. The dependent variable in Column 1 is a dummy variable for whether the respondent indicated the information received was on the relationship between trade and jobs; that in Column 2 is a dummy variable for whether the respondent indicated the information received was on the relationship between trade and prices; while that in Columns 3-4 is the first principal component measure (from Column 6 of Table 4) constructed to be increasing in preferences for more limits on trade. The controls included (but not reported) are as listed in the Table 3 footnotes, as well as Democrat and Republican dummies for the candidate supported in the most recent presidential election. In Columns 1 and 2, the randomization order variable is the rank order in which "about jobs" (respectively, "about prices") appeared in the answer options to the respondent; in Columns 3-4, the randomization variable is the rank order in which "More Limits on Imports" appeared in the "Most Preferred" list of 8 policies. Columns 1-2 report marginal effects from logit regressions, evaluated setting the initial values of the treatment dummies to zero, while setting all other right-hand side controls at their in-sample mean values. Columns 3-4 report OLS regressions. Standard errors are clustered by respondent county, and computed where necessary by the delta method; ***, ** and * denote

Table 7
Role of Attention Paid as Captured by Treatment Duration
(Pooled: Round 2, 2020; Round 3, 2021; Round 4, 2022)

Trade Policy Questions:	(1) Info correct?	(2) First principal component	(3) First principal component	(4) First principal component
	Logit	OLS	OLS	OLS
Treatment duration:	All	Below median	Above median	Top quintile
Above-median treatment duration	0.251***			
	[0.013]			
Above-median survey duration	-0.028**			
	[0.012]			
Trade Hurts Jobs		0.162***	0.330***	0.497***
		[0.050]	[0.057]	[0.080]
Trade Helps Jobs		0.116**	0.051	0.057
		[0.050]	[0.057]	[0.087]
Trade Helps Prices		0.141***	0.090*	0.060
		[0.050]	[0.053]	[0.076]
Tariff Hurts Prices		0.154***	0.057	0.020
		[0.048]	[0.058]	[0.082]
Individual, county, week, rand. order contro	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	9,275	5,760	5,754	3,643
(Pseudo) R-squared	0.0632	0.143	0.172	0.158

Notes: Based on the Round 2 (2020), Round 3 (2021), and Round 4 (2022) samples; comprising respondents in the "Control" group who received no information treatment (the omitted category), as well as those who received the "Trade Hurts Jobs", "Trade Helps Jobs", "Trade Helps Prices", and "Tariff Hurts Prices" treatments. The dependent variable in Column 1 is a dummy variable equal to one if the respondent correctly identified the nature of the information received in the survey ("about jobs", "about prices", "none"), while that in Columns 2-4 is the first principal component measure (from Column 6 of Table 4) constructed to be increasing in preferences for more limits on trade. The Columns 2-4 samples comprise all "Control" observations and respondents who spent respectively a below median, above median, and top quintile duration on their received information treatment (computed within treatment-by-round). The controls included (but not reported) are as listed in the Table 3 footnotes, as well as Democrat and Republican dummies for the candidate supported in the last presidential election; Columns 2-4 further include the randomization rank order in which "More Limits on Imports" appeared in the "Most Preferred" list of 8 policies. Column 1 reports marginal effects from logit regressions, evaluated setting the initial values of all right-hand side controls at their in-sample mean values. Columns 2-4 report OLS regressions. Standard errors are clustered by respondent county, and computed where necessary by the delta method; ***, ** and * denote significance

Table 8
Reasons for More Limits on Imports as a Most Preferred Policy: Summary Statistics
(Pooled: Round 3, 2021; Round 4, 2022)

Reasons: (5=Strongly agree, 1=Strongly disagree)	Not persuaded	Imports often lower quality	Imports potential threat to National security	Imports often compete for US jobs	Concerned about imports from China	Other more important concerns
Information Treatment received:						
Control (N = 302)	---	3.54 [1.08]	3.41 [1.12]	3.85 [1.09]	3.96 [1.08]	3.61 [1.01]
Trade Hurts Jobs (N = 270)	3.84 [1.02] Pers.	3.74 [0.96]	3.47 [1.00]	4.09 [0.91]	4.04 [0.99]	3.81 [0.94]
Trade Hurts Jobs sans China (N = 183)	3.65 [1.07] Pers.	3.64 [1.01]	3.56 [1.05]	3.98 [1.01]	3.83 [1.11]	3.70 [1.02]
Trade Helps Jobs (N = 238)	3.62 [1.04]	3.79 [1.04]	3.69 [1.07]	4.06 [0.98]	4.29 [0.97]	3.80 [0.95]
Trade Helps Jobs sans China (N = 171)	3.63 [0.92]	3.63 [1.00]	3.40 [0.99]	3.92 [0.96]	3.94 [1.18]	3.60 [0.99]
Trade Helps Prices (N = 250)	3.30 [1.02]	3.75 [0.99]	3.43 [1.06]	4.06 [0.99]	4.05 [0.98]	3.90 [0.85]
Trade Helps Prices sans China (N = 256)	3.50 [1.08]	3.70 [1.09]	3.53 [1.13]	4.09 [1.00]	4.08 [1.08]	3.81 [1.03]
Tariff Hurts Prices (N = 245)	3.27 [1.06]	3.61 [1.15]	3.50 [1.11]	3.94 [1.05]	4.12 [1.01]	3.70 [0.99]
All other Treatments (N = 775)	3.49 [1.09]	3.72 [1.06]	3.55 [1.05]	4.01 [1.00]	4.09 [0.99]	3.68 [0.95]

Notes: Mean values reported, with standard deviations in brackets. Based on the sample of Round 3 (2021) and Round 4 (2022) respondents who selected "More Limits on Imports" as a top three "Most Preferred" policy and were directed to these follow-up questions on their reasons for this preference. For the "Trade Hurts Jobs" and "Trade Hurts Jobs sans China" treatments, the summary statistics in the first column (with superscript "Pers.") are agreement scores with being "persuaded that imports have hurts jobs in the U.S.", rather than being "not persuaded". The "All other Treatments" row pools the agreement scores across the "Trade Hurts Helps Jobs", "Trade Helps Hurts Jobs", and "Trade Helps Prices sans Cheaper" treatment groups.

Table 1a
Treatment Balance: Survey Round 1 (2018-2019)

TREATMENT:	Control	Trade Hurts Jobs	Trade Helps Jobs	Trade Helps Prices
Biodata				
Gender: Male	0.49 [0.50]	0.48 [0.50]	0.50 [0.50]	0.49 [0.50]
Gender: Female	0.50 [0.50]	0.51 [0.50]	0.50 [0.50]	0.50 [0.50]
Age: Average (approx.)	47.14 [17.11]	48.10 [16.78]	47.82 [17.02]	47.17 [16.19]
Race: White	0.60 [0.49]	0.60 [0.49]	0.64 [0.48]	0.62 [0.49]
Race: African-American	0.13 [0.33]	0.11 [0.31]	0.11 [0.32]	0.11 [0.31]
Race: Hispanic	0.15 [0.36]	0.18 [0.38]	0.17 [0.37]	0.18 [0.38]
Born in US?	0.92 [0.28]	0.91 [0.29]	0.93 [0.25]	0.92 [0.27]
Socio-Economic Characteristics				
Household Income: Average $ (approx.)	56,283 [46,165]	59,436 [49,180]	60,356 [50,360]	56,851 [44,589]
Education: Average years (approx.)	11.84 [4.97]	11.98 [4.87]	11.70 [4.93]	11.73 [4.88]
Employment Status: Not in Labor Force	0.41 [0.49]	0.39 [0.49]	0.38 [0.49]	0.40 [0.49]
Employment Status: Unemployed	0.11 [0.32]	0.09 [0.28]	0.10 [0.30]	0.09 [0.29]
Employment Status: Employed	0.48 [0.50]	0.52 [0.50]	0.52 [0.50]	0.50 [0.50]
Employment Sector: Manufacturing	0.07 [0.26]	0.08 [0.27]	0.08 [0.27]	0.07 [0.25]
Employment Sector: Services	0.36 [0.48]	0.41 [0.49]	0.41 [0.49]	0.40 [0.49]
Student?	0.04 [0.20]	0.03 [0.17]	0.03 [0.16]	0.03 [0.17]
Baseline Socio-Political Attributes				
Last Presidential election: Supported Dem.	0.42 [0.49]	0.41 [0.49]	0.42 [0.49]	0.41 [0.49]
Last Presidential election: Supported Rep.	0.34 [0.48]	0.34 [0.47]	0.34 [0.47]	0.34 [0.48]
Trust in government? (Scale: 1 to 5)	2.42 [1.06]	2.45 [1.10]	2.64 [1.02]	2.51 [1.02]
Impact of NAFTA on family (Scale: 1 to 5)	3.15 [0.89]	3.12 [0.95]	3.18 [0.86]	3.17 [0.88]
Children born into better life? (Scale: 1 to 5)	3.03 [1.09]	3.09 [1.17]	3.08 [1.11]	3.07 [1.14]
Satisfied with health of US job market?	0.46 [0.50]	0.48 [0.50]	0.48 [0.50]	0.52 [0.50]
Willing to pay more for US brand?	0.59 [0.49]	0.59 [0.49]	0.59 [0.49]	0.57 [0.49]
Inequality in US a problem? (Scale: 1 to 4)	3.07 [0.93]	2.94 [1.01]	3.02 [0.93]	3.01 [0.94]
News consumption patterns				
Number of days per week (approx.)	4.90 [2.52]	5.11 [2.47]	5.03 [2.45]	5.02 [2.44]
Main tv source: Broadcast tv	0.26 [0.44]	0.31 [0.46]	0.28 [0.45]	0.29 [0.45]
Main tv source: CNN, MSNBC	0.18 [0.38]	0.17 [0.38]	0.18 [0.38]	0.15 [0.36]
Main tv source: Fox News	0.15 [0.36]	0.14 [0.35]	0.16 [0.37]	0.17 [0.38]
Location Characteristics				
Share with college and above (age>=25)	0.31 [0.11]	0.30 [0.10]	0.30 [0.11]	0.29 [0.11]
Autor-Dorn-Hanson measure for 2000s	2.58 [1.80]	2.50 [1.66]	2.59 [1.83]	2.56 [2.00]
Share of manufacturing in employment	0.16 [0.11]	0.16 [0.11]	0.17 [0.12]	0.17 [0.12]
Urban?	0.89 [0.31]	0.87 [0.34]	0.83 [0.37]	0.84 [0.36]
Survey Characteristics				
Duration to complete (secs.)	594 [571]	619 [406]	936 [2,683]	774 [1,324]
Treatment duration	---	47 [70]	45 [50]	50 [74]
Mobile device?	0.57 [0.50]	0.57 [0.50]	0.65 [0.48]	0.64 [0.48]

Notes: Mean values reported for each control or treatment group, with standard deviations in brackets. For respondent age, household income, and frequency of news consumpton, this is approximated by a weighted average of the midpoint values of the response option bins, using the share of respondents picking each bin as weights. For respondent years of education, an analogous weighted average is taken that assigns 6 years to "High school or less", 14 years to "Some college", 16 years to "College graduate", and 18 years to "Post graduate". The randomization-t p-value (c.f., Young 2009) for a multiple hypothesis test of the orthogonality of the above covariates with respect to the Round 1 treatment dummies is 0.864 (based on 1,000 iterations, controlling for survey-week fixed effects); the survey and treatment duration variables are excluded from the covariate set examined in this test.

Table 1b
Treatment Balance: Survey Round 2 (2020)

TREATMENT:	Control	Trade Hurts Jobs	Trade Helps Jobs	Trade Helps Prices	Tariff Hurts Prices	Trade Hurts Helps Jobs	Trade Helps Hurts Jobs	Trade Helps Prices sans China	Trade Helps Prices sans Cheaper
Biodata									
Gender: Male	0.45 [0.50]	0.47 [0.50]	0.48 [0.50]	0.48 [0.50]	0.49 [0.50]	0.49 [0.50]	0.48 [0.50]	0.44 [0.50]	0.46 [0.50]
Gender: Female	0.55 [0.50]	0.53 [0.50]	0.52 [0.50]	0.51 [0.50]	0.51 [0.50]	0.50 [0.50]	0.52 [0.50]	0.55 [0.50]	0.53 [0.50]
Age: Average (approx.)	44.34 [16.48]	44.88 [17.10]	44.43 [16.88]	44.15 [16.48]	45.31 [16.77]	45.76 [16.75]	47.32 [16.38]	46.78 [15.91]	48.80 [15.52]
Race: White	0.69 [0.46]	0.66 [0.47]	0.67 [0.47]	0.64 [0.48]	0.68 [0.47]	0.69 [0.46]	0.70 [0.46]	0.65 [0.48]	0.64 [0.48]
Race: African-American	0.11 [0.32]	0.13 [0.34]	0.13 [0.34]	0.16 [0.37]	0.12 [0.32]	0.13 [0.34]	0.13 [0.34]	0.11 [0.31]	0.10 [0.30]
Race: Hispanic	0.11 [0.32]	0.14 [0.35]	0.13 [0.33]	0.14 [0.35]	0.13 [0.34]	0.11 [0.32]	0.10 [0.31]	0.18 [0.38]	0.17 [0.38]
Born in US?	0.93 [0.25]	0.93 [0.26]	0.93 [0.26]	0.92 [0.28]	0.91 [0.28]	0.92 [0.27]	0.93 [0.25]	0.92 [0.27]	0.90 [0.30]
Socio-Economic Characteristics									
Household Income: Average $ (approx.)	66,541 [54,351]	64,642 [53,897]	63,792 [54,351]	64,681 [54,427]	66,636 [55,145]	65,231 [52,956]	63,136 [50,864]	64,825 [55,512]	63,651 [54,416]
Education: Average years (approx.)	12.09 [4.83]	11.62 [4.90]	11.74 [4.78]	11.74 [4.82]	11.55 [4.90]	11.66 [4.73]	11.54 [4.85]	10.68 [4.93]	10.96 [4.92]
Employment Status: Not in Labor Force	0.36 [0.48]	0.40 [0.49]	0.36 [0.48]	0.38 [0.49]	0.39 [0.49]	0.42 [0.49]	0.40 [0.49]	0.38 [0.49]	0.41 [0.49]
Employment Status: Unemployed	0.15 [0.36]	0.12 [0.32]	0.12 [0.32]	0.10 [0.30]	0.10 [0.30]	0.10 [0.30]	0.09 [0.29]	0.13 [0.33]	0.09 [0.29]
Employment Status: Employed	0.49 [0.50]	0.48 [0.50]	0.52 [0.50]	0.52 [0.50]	0.51 [0.50]	0.48 [0.50]	0.51 [0.50]	0.49 [0.50]	0.50 [0.50]
Employment Sector: Manufacturing	0.07 [0.25]	0.09 [0.29]	0.09 [0.29]	0.09 [0.28]	0.11 [0.31]	0.08 [0.27]	0.07 [0.25]	0.09 [0.28]	0.08 [0.27]
Employment Sector: Services	0.37 [0.48]	0.32 [0.47]	0.38 [0.48]	0.37 [0.48]	0.36 [0.48]	0.35 [0.48]	0.38 [0.49]	0.36 [0.48]	0.38 [0.48]
Student?	0.04 [0.19]	0.05 [0.22]	0.05 [0.21]	0.05 [0.21]	0.05 [0.22]	0.05 [0.21]	0.04 [0.20]	0.02 [0.14]	0.03 [0.17]
Loss aversion (Scale: 1 to 5)	3.08 [1.46]	3.09 [1.47]	3.23 [1.44]	3.15 [1.45]	3.10 [1.46]	3.06 [1.52]	3.02 [1.46]	3.11 [1.48]	3.10 [1.56]
Baseline Socio-Political Attributes									
Last Presidential election: Supported Dem.	0.41 [0.49]	0.41 [0.49]	0.39 [0.49]	0.42 [0.49]	0.42 [0.49]	0.39 [0.49]	0.42 [0.49]	0.42 [0.49]	0.42 [0.49]
Last Presidential election: Supported Rep.	0.36 [0.48]	0.35 [0.48]	0.36 [0.48]	0.36 [0.48]	0.37 [0.48]	0.38 [0.49]	0.36 [0.48]	0.33 [0.47]	0.39 [0.49]
Trust in government? (Scale: 1 to 5)	2.77 [1.13]	2.79 [1.13]	2.83 [1.14]	2.82 [1.12]	2.77 [1.12]	2.78 [1.11]	2.83 [1.16]	2.69 [1.15]	2.79 [1.16]
Impact of NAFTA on family (Scale: 1 to 5)	3.39 [0.91]	3.34 [0.85]	3.34 [0.94]	3.41 [0.88]	3.32 [0.89]	3.35 [0.91]	3.33 [0.86]	3.33 [0.90]	3.29 [0.95]
Children born into better life? (Scale: 1 to 5)	3.24 [1.09]	3.26 [1.11]	3.27 [1.07]	3.27 [1.08]	3.23 [1.08]	3.19 [1.10]	3.24 [1.08]	3.11 [1.14]	3.15 [1.15]
Satisfied with health of US job market?	0.34 [0.47]	0.36 [0.48]	0.34 [0.47]	0.37 [0.48]	0.34 [0.47]	0.32 [0.47]	0.33 [0.47]	0.36 [0.48]	0.32 [0.47]
Willing to pay more for US brand?	0.66 [0.48]	0.64 [0.48]	0.64 [0.48]	0.68 [0.47]	0.63 [0.48]	0.64 [0.48]	0.65 [0.48]	0.64 [0.48]	0.68 [0.47]
Inequality in US a problem? (Scale: 1 to 4)	2.92 [0.95]	2.95 [0.96]	2.97 [0.94]	2.98 [0.93]	2.98 [0.94]	2.84 [0.98]	2.93 [0.91]	3.07 [0.95]	3.01 [0.96]
News consumption patterns									
Number of days per week (approx.)	5.41 [2.26]	5.24 [2.38]	5.17 [2.45]	5.36 [2.28]	5.16 [2.40]	5.35 [2.30]	5.58 [2.16]	5.19 [2.39]	5.33 [2.36]
Main tv source: Broadcast tv	0.24 [0.43]	0.29 [0.45]	0.24 [0.43]	0.25 [0.44]	0.26 [0.44]	0.25 [0.43]	0.28 [0.45]	0.22 [0.41]	0.26 [0.44]
Main tv source: CNN, MSNBC	0.22 [0.41]	0.20 [0.40]	0.21 [0.41]	0.20 [0.40]	0.20 [0.40]	0.20 [0.40]	0.19 [0.39]	0.23 [0.42]	0.21 [0.41]
Main tv source: Fox News	0.18 [0.38]	0.17 [0.38]	0.20 [0.40]	0.16 [0.37]	0.17 [0.38]	0.17 [0.38]	0.19 [0.40]	0.15 [0.36]	0.16 [0.37]
Location Characteristics									
Share with college and above (age>=25)	0.32 [0.12]	0.31 [0.12]	0.31 [0.12]	0.31 [0.12]	0.32 [0.12]	0.30 [0.11]	0.31 [0.11]	0.32 [0.12]	0.30 [0.12]
Autor-Dorn-Hanson measure for 2000s	2.59 [2.02]	2.46 [1.91]	2.71 [2.40]	2.51 [2.18]	2.55 [2.05]	2.60 [2.32]	2.66 [1.88]	2.51 [1.79]	2.55 [2.34]
Share of manufacturing in employment	0.16 [0.11]	0.15 [0.11]	0.16 [0.11]	0.15 [0.11]	0.15 [0.11]	0.16 [0.11]	0.16 [0.12]	0.16 [0.12]	0.16 [0.12]
Urban?	0.89 [0.32]	0.88 [0.33]	0.86 [0.35]	0.87 [0.33]	0.88 [0.33]	0.89 [0.32]	0.87 [0.34]	0.89 [0.31]	0.84 [0.36]
Survey Characteristics									
Duration to complete (secs.)	887 [1,812]	871 [1,204]	952 [2,337]	1,031 [4,706]	924 [1,263]	779 [727]	831 [1,113]	854 [737]	1,003 [2,240]
Treatment duration	---	26 [78]	33 [96]	32 [165]	26 [44]	34 [46]	34 [42]	28 [55]	31 [60]
Mobile device?	0.71 [0.46]	0.71 [0.46]	0.69 [0.46]	0.70 [0.46]	0.69 [0.46]	0.64 [0.48]	0.65 [0.48]	0.77 [0.42]	0.72 [0.45]

Notes: Mean values reported for each control or treatment group, with standard deviations in brackets. For respondent age, household income, and frequency of news consumpton, this is approximated by a weighted average of the midpoint values of the response option bins, using the share of respondents picking each bin as weights. For respondent years of education, an analogous weighted average is taken that assigns 6 years to "High school or less", 14 years to "Some college", 16 years to "College graduate", and 18 years to "Post graduate". The randomization-t p-value (c.f., Young 2009) for a multiple hypothesis test of the orthogonality of the above covariates with respect to the Round 2 treatment dummies is 0.019 when age and education years are included, and 0.546 when these two variables are excluded (based on 1,000 iterations, controlling for survey-week fixed effects); the survey and treatment duration variables are excluded throughout from the covariate set examined in these tests.

Table 1c
Treatment Balance: Survey Round 3 (2021)

TREATMENT:	Control	Trade Hurts Jobs	Trade Helps Jobs	Trade Helps Prices	Tariff Hurts Prices	Trade Hurts Helps Jobs	Trade Helps Hurts Jobs	Trade Helps Prices sans China	Trade Helps Prices sans Cheaper
Biodata									
Gender: Male	0.46 [0.50]	0.50 [0.50]	0.46 [0.50]	0.51 [0.50]	0.48 [0.50]	0.50 [0.50]	0.50 [0.50]	0.48 [0.50]	0.50 [0.50]
Gender: Female	0.54 [0.50]	0.50 [0.50]	0.53 [0.50]	0.49 [0.50]	0.52 [0.50]	0.49 [0.50]	0.50 [0.50]	0.52 [0.50]	0.50 [0.50]
Age: Average (approx.)	45.53 [17.23]	45.91 [16.49]	46.29 [16.50]	47.19 [16.97]	45.96 [17.10]	46.76 [16.15]	47.44 [16.77]	47.65 [16.57]	46.20 [16.43]
Race: White	0.61 [0.49]	0.61 [0.49]	0.62 [0.49]	0.64 [0.48]	0.64 [0.48]	0.60 [0.49]	0.62 [0.49]	0.63 [0.48]	0.63 [0.48]
Race: African-American	0.13 [0.33]	0.13 [0.34]	0.12 [0.33]	0.11 [0.31]	0.10 [0.30]	0.12 [0.33]	0.13 [0.34]	0.12 [0.33]	0.10 [0.30]
Race: Hispanic	0.16 [0.37]	0.18 [0.38]	0.18 [0.39]	0.17 [0.37]	0.17 [0.37]	0.18 [0.38]	0.16 [0.37]	0.19 [0.39]	0.20 [0.40]
Born in US?	0.90 [0.30]	0.91 [0.28]	0.91 [0.29]	0.94 [0.24]	0.92 [0.27]	0.91 [0.29]	0.89 [0.31]	0.93 [0.26]	0.92 [0.28]
Socio-Economic Characteristics									
Household Income: Average $ (approx.)	61,560 [50,471]	61,932 [48,021]	60,963 [46,445]	66,472 [54,351]	64,456 [51,312]	59,767 [49,064]	60,991 [48,760]	58,790 [46,746]	63,182 [49,566]
Education: Average years (approx.)	11.83 [4.89]	11.57 [4.87]	11.89 [4.82]	11.52 [4.98]	11.86 [4.83]	11.72 [4.80]	11.95 [4.90]	11.57 [4.89]	11.43 [4.89]
Employment Status: Not in Labor Force	0.42 [0.49]	0.36 [0.48]	0.41 [0.49]	0.44 [0.50]	0.40 [0.49]	0.34 [0.48]	0.41 [0.49]	0.40 [0.49]	0.37 [0.48]
Employment Status: Unemployed	0.09 [0.29]	0.11 [0.32]	0.11 [0.31]	0.08 [0.28]	0.10 [0.30]	0.13 [0.33]	0.10 [0.30]	0.09 [0.29]	0.11 [0.31]
Employment Status: Employed	0.49 [0.50]	0.53 [0.50]	0.49 [0.50]	0.47 [0.50]	0.50 [0.50]	0.53 [0.50]	0.50 [0.50]	0.51 [0.50]	0.52 [0.50]
Employment Sector: Manufacturing	0.07 [0.26]	0.07 [0.26]	0.10 [0.30]	0.07 [0.26]	0.05 [0.21]	0.09 [0.28]	0.06 [0.23]	0.08 [0.27]	0.08 [0.27]
Employment Sector: Services	0.38 [0.49]	0.42 [0.49]	0.36 [0.48]	0.37 [0.48]	0.40 [0.49]	0.39 [0.49]	0.41 [0.49]	0.39 [0.49]	0.40 [0.49]
Student?	0.06 [0.24]	0.02 [0.15]	0.04 [0.21]	0.05 [0.21]	0.05 [0.22]	0.02 [0.16]	0.04 [0.18]	0.05 [0.22]	0.03 [0.17]
Loss aversion (Scale: 1 to 5)	3.14 [1.48]	3.16 [1.48]	3.17 [1.55]	3.07 [1.51]	3.08 [1.52]	2.97 [1.49]	2.93 [1.45]	3.06 [1.52]	3.08 [1.47]
Baseline Socio-Political Attributes									
Last Presidential election: Supported Dem.	0.51 [0.50]	0.53 [0.50]	0.49 [0.50]	0.48 [0.50]	0.48 [0.50]	0.48 [0.50]	0.52 [0.50]	0.50 [0.50]	0.45 [0.50]
Last Presidential election: Supported Rep.	0.30 [0.46]	0.32 [0.47]	0.32 [0.47]	0.35 [0.48]	0.32 [0.47]	0.31 [0.46]	0.31 [0.47]	0.34 [0.47]	0.36 [0.48]
Trust in government? (Scale: 1 to 5)	2.66 [1.11]	2.69 [1.16]	2.63 [1.07]	2.80 [1.16]	2.77 [1.10]	2.59 [1.10]	2.73 [1.10]	2.61 [1.11]	2.69 [1.08]
Impact of NAFTA on family (Scale: 1 to 5)	3.30 [0.88]	3.32 [0.92]	3.28 [0.90]	3.40 [0.88]	3.33 [0.85]	3.30 [0.83]	3.28 [0.87]	3.23 [0.85]	3.33 [0.85]
Children born into better life? (Scale: 1 to 5)	3.11 [1.16]	3.16 [1.17]	3.10 [1.08]	3.25 [1.19]	3.21 [1.14]	3.17 [1.14]	3.12 [1.11]	3.07 [1.17]	3.22 [1.15]
Satisfied with health of US job market?	0.37 [0.48]	0.42 [0.49]	0.37 [0.48]	0.42 [0.49]	0.41 [0.49]	0.40 [0.49]	0.39 [0.49]	0.41 [0.49]	0.37 [0.48]
Willing to pay more for US brand?	0.61 [0.49]	0.63 [0.48]	0.63 [0.48]	0.66 [0.47]	0.65 [0.48]	0.60 [0.49]	0.64 [0.48]	0.64 [0.48]	0.64 [0.48]
Inequality in US a problem? (Scale: 1 to 4)	2.94 [1.01]	2.97 [0.98]	3.00 [0.95]	3.01 [0.92]	3.03 [0.92]	3.02 [0.94]	2.93 [0.98]	2.94 [0.97]	2.93 [0.95]
News consumption patterns									
Number of days per week (approx.)	4.94 [2.45]	4.90 [2.45]	4.88 [2.49]	5.25 [2.31]	4.99 [2.47]	4.85 [2.49]	5.05 [2.45]	5.09 [2.46]	5.10 [2.32]
Main tv source: Broadcast tv	0.25 [0.43]	0.26 [0.44]	0.24 [0.43]	0.27 [0.44]	0.24 [0.43]	0.23 [0.42]	0.27 [0.44]	0.25 [0.44]	0.25 [0.44]
Main tv source: CNN, MSNBC	0.20 [0.40]	0.19 [0.39]	0.19 [0.40]	0.20 [0.40]	0.21 [0.41]	0.22 [0.42]	0.21 [0.41]	0.19 [0.39]	0.17 [0.38]
Main tv source: Fox News	0.15 [0.36]	0.16 [0.37]	0.15 [0.36]	0.14 [0.35]	0.14 [0.35]	0.15 [0.36]	0.13 [0.34]	0.13 [0.34]	0.17 [0.38]
Location Characteristics									
Share with college and above (age>=25)	0.30 [0.10]	0.30 [0.11]	0.31 [0.11]	0.30 [0.11]	0.31 [0.11]	0.30 [0.10]	0.31 [0.11]	0.30 [0.11]	0.31 [0.11]
Autor-Dorn-Hanson measure for 2000s	2.46 [1.68]	2.46 [1.60]	2.50 [1.60]	2.63 [1.98]	2.57 [1.84]	2.55 [1.84]	2.53 [1.82]	2.64 [1.75]	2.50 [1.77]
Share of manufacturing in employment	0.16 [0.11]	0.16 [0.11]	0.16 [0.11]	0.16 [0.11]	0.17 [0.12]	0.16 [0.11]	0.16 [0.11]	0.17 [0.12]	0.16 [0.10]
Urban?	0.88 [0.33]	0.88 [0.33]	0.86 [0.35]	0.85 [0.36]	0.85 [0.36]	0.86 [0.34]	0.86 [0.35]	0.85 [0.36]	0.86 [0.35]
Survey Characteristics									
Duration to complete (secs.)	881 [853]	873 [1,106]	859 [846]	901 [672]	857 [601]	956 [949]	892 [807]	847 [621]	923 [1,959]
Treatment duration	---	26 [30]	30 [47]	31 [56]	29 [79]	41 [63]	38 [97]	31 [52]	25 [32]
Mobile device?	0.60 [0.49]	0.57 [0.50]	0.62 [0.49]	0.54 [0.50]	0.57 [0.49]	0.59 [0.49]	0.57 [0.49]	0.56 [0.50]	0.57 [0.50]

Notes: Mean values reported for each control or treatment group, with standard deviations in brackets. For respondent age, household income, and frequency of news consumpton, this is approximated by a weighted average of the midpoint values of the response option bins, using the share of respondents picking each bin as weights. For respondent years of education, an analogous weighted average is taken that assigns 6 years to "High school or less", 14 years to "Some college", 16 years to "College graduate", and 18 years to "Post graduate". The randomization-t p-value (c.f., Young 2009) for a multiple hypothesis test of the orthogonality of the above covariates with respect to the Round 3 treatment dummies is 0.509 (based on 1,000 iterations, controlling for survey-week fixed effects); the survey and treatment duration variables are excluded from the covariate set examined in this test.

Table 1d
Treatment Balance: Survey Round 4 (2022)

TREATMENT:	Control	Trade Hurts Jobs	Trade Helps Jobs	Trade Helps Prices	Tariff Hurts Prices	Trade Hurts Helps Jobs	Trade Helps Hurts Jobs
Biodata							
Gender: Male	0.48 [0.50]	0.46 [0.50]	0.47 [0.50]	0.49 [0.50]	0.50 [0.50]	0.49 [0.50]	0.46 [0.50]
Gender: Female	0.52 [0.50]	0.53 [0.50]	0.53 [0.50]	0.51 [0.50]	0.49 [0.50]	0.50 [0.50]	0.53 [0.50]
Age: Average (approx.)	46.02 [16.90]	46.58 [16.11]	46.88 [16.84]	47.47 [16.51]	45.66 [17.02]	46.94 [16.14]	46.04 [17.48]
Race: White	0.61 [0.49]	0.63 [0.48]	0.63 [0.48]	0.62 [0.49]	0.62 [0.49]	0.65 [0.48]	0.61 [0.49]
Race: African-American	0.12 [0.33]	0.13 [0.34]	0.11 [0.32]	0.12 [0.33]	0.11 [0.31]	0.13 [0.33]	0.14 [0.35]
Race: Hispanic	0.18 [0.38]	0.15 [0.36]	0.18 [0.39]	0.17 [0.38]	0.18 [0.39]	0.15 [0.36]	0.15 [0.36]
Born in US?	0.91 [0.29]	0.93 [0.26]	0.93 [0.25]	0.93 [0.26]	0.93 [0.26]	0.91 [0.28]	0.90 [0.29]
Socio-Economic Characteristics							
Household Income: Average $ (approx.)	56,923 [44,204]	58,259 [45,365]	61,117 [47,971]	61,637 [48,177]	58,484 [44,529]	60,407 [44,629]	58,900 [45,744]
Education: Average years (approx.)	11.55 [4.81]	11.73 [4.85]	11.71 [4.95]	11.91 [4.89]	11.93 [4.84]	11.98 [4.77]	11.68 [4.88]
Employment Status: Not in Labor Force	0.38 [0.49]	0.38 [0.48]	0.41 [0.49]	0.39 [0.49]	0.41 [0.49]	0.38 [0.49]	0.40 [0.49]
Employment Status: Unemployed	0.12 [0.32]	0.11 [0.31]	0.10 [0.30]	0.09 [0.29]	0.09 [0.29]	0.08 [0.28]	0.09 [0.29]
Employment Status: Employed	0.50 [0.50]	0.52 [0.50]	0.48 [0.50]	0.52 [0.50]	0.50 [0.50]	0.53 [0.50]	0.51 [0.50]
Employment Sector: Manufacturing	0.08 [0.27]	0.05 [0.22]	0.07 [0.25]	0.06 [0.25]	0.07 [0.25]	0.05 [0.22]	0.07 [0.26]
Employment Sector: Services	0.39 [0.49]	0.42 [0.49]	0.39 [0.49]	0.41 [0.49]	0.39 [0.49]	0.43 [0.49]	0.42 [0.49]
Student?	0.02 [0.15]	0.03 [0.16]	0.03 [0.17]	0.03 [0.16]	0.04 [0.20]	0.04 [0.20]	0.04 [0.19]
Loss aversion (Scale: 1 to 5)	3.12 [1.46]	3.13 [1.53]	2.98 [1.53]	3.01 [1.51]	3.06 [1.47]	3.04 [1.48]	3.12 [1.47]
Baseline Socio-Political Attributes							
Last Presidential election: Supported Dem.	0.43 [0.50]	0.47 [0.50]	0.47 [0.50]	0.46 [0.50]	0.45 [0.50]	0.42 [0.49]	0.41 [0.49]
Last Presidential election: Supported Rep.	0.34 [0.48]	0.31 [0.46]	0.33 [0.47]	0.36 [0.48]	0.35 [0.48]	0.39 [0.49]	0.36 [0.48]
Trust in government? (Scale: 1 to 5)	2.54 [1.12]	2.57 [1.06]	2.62 [1.08]	2.51 [1.06]	2.54 [1.06]	2.50 [1.02]	2.53 [1.01]
Impact of NAFTA on family (Scale: 1 to 5)	3.10 [0.91]	3.23 [0.90]	3.15 [0.86]	3.09 [0.88]	3.08 [0.88]	3.13 [0.89]	3.10 [0.87]
Children born into better life? (Scale: 1 to 5	2.92 [1.18]	3.00 [1.13]	3.08 [1.09]	3.01 [1.10]	2.96 [1.12]	3.03 [1.13]	2.99 [1.09]
Satisfied with health of US job market?	0.41 [0.49]	0.45 [0.50]	0.40 [0.49]	0.43 [0.50]	0.38 [0.48]	0.41 [0.49]	0.42 [0.49]
Willing to pay more for US brand?	0.60 [0.49]	0.62 [0.48]	0.65 [0.48]	0.59 [0.49]	0.60 [0.49]	0.60 [0.49]	0.63 [0.48]
Inequality in US a problem? (Scale: 1 to 4)	2.99 [0.93]	3.02 [0.92]	3.03 [0.95]	3.04 [0.89]	3.07 [0.95]	2.92 [0.93]	2.91 [0.95]
Inflation in US a problem? (Scale: 1 to 4)	3.40 [0.82]	3.45 [0.78]	3.41 [0.80]	3.38 [0.79]	3.47 [0.78]	3.42 [0.79]	3.43 [0.76]
News consumption patterns							
Number of days per week (approx.)	4.86 [2.51]	4.90 [2.52]	5.03 [2.48]	5.10 [2.47]	4.92 [2.54]	4.92 [2.51]	4.90 [2.46]
Main tv source: Broadcast tv	0.24 [0.43]	0.27 [0.44]	0.25 [0.43]	0.27 [0.45]	0.28 [0.45]	0.26 [0.44]	0.26 [0.44]
Main tv source: CNN, MSNBC	0.15 [0.36]	0.15 [0.36]	0.19 [0.40]	0.15 [0.36]	0.16 [0.37]	0.15 [0.35]	0.15 [0.36]
Main tv source: Fox News	0.16 [0.37]	0.16 [0.37]	0.15 [0.36]	0.18 [0.38]	0.15 [0.35]	0.17 [0.38]	0.15 [0.36]
Location Characteristics							
Share with college and above (age>=25)	0.30 [0.10]	0.30 [0.10]	0.29 [0.10]	0.31 [0.11]	0.30 [0.11]	0.30 [0.11]	0.31 [0.11]
Autor-Dorn-Hanson measure for 2000s	2.63 [2.03]	2.45 [1.72]	2.49 [1.78]	2.74 [1.89]	2.61 [2.11]	2.46 [1.79]	2.72 [2.13]
Share of manufacturing in employment	0.16 [0.11]	0.16 [0.10]	0.15 [0.10]	0.17 [0.11]	0.16 [0.11]	0.17 [0.11]	0.17 [0.11]
Urban?	0.86 [0.35]	0.85 [0.35]	0.83 [0.38]	0.86 [0.35]	0.85 [0.36]	0.85 [0.35]	0.87 [0.33]
Survey Characteristics							
Duration to complete (secs.)	892 [957]	862 [674]	885 [644]	938 [889]	857 [618]	836 [590]	944 [1,246]
Treatment duration	---	29 [53]	29 [49]	30 [63]	26 [27]	36 [40]	37 [56]
Mobile device?	0.57 [0.50]	0.49 [0.50]	0.43 [0.50]	0.51 [0.50]	0.45 [0.50]	0.51 [0.50]	0.51 [0.50]

Notes: Mean values reported for each control or treatment group, with standard deviations in brackets. For respondent age, household income, and frequency of news consumption, this is approximated by a weighted average of the midpoint values of the response option bins, using the share of respondents picking each bin as weights. For respondent years of education, an analogous weighted average is taken that assigns 6 years to "High school or less", 14 years to "Some college", 16 years to "College graduate", and 18 years to "Post graduate".The randomization-t p-value (c.f., Young 2009) for a multiple hypothesis test of the orthogonality of the above covariates with respect to the Round 4 treatment dummies is 0.438 (based on 1,000 iterations, controlling for survey-week fixed effects); the survey and treatment duration variables are excluded from the covariate set examined in this test.

Table 1e
Treatment Balance: Survey Round 4 (2022)

TREATMENT:	Trade Hurts Jobs sans China	Trade Helps Jobs sans China	Trade Helps Prices sans China	Trade Helps Prices sans Cheaper
Biodata				
Gender: Male	0.48 [0.50]	0.46 [0.50]	0.48 [0.50]	0.45 [0.50]
Gender: Female	0.51 [0.50]	0.53 [0.50]	0.52 [0.50]	0.54 [0.50]
Age: Average (approx.)	47.22 [16.45]	45.77 [17.13]	46.83 [16.84]	46.04 [17.00]
Race: White	0.58 [0.49]	0.60 [0.49]	0.64 [0.48]	0.62 [0.48]
Race: African-American	0.13 [0.34]	0.12 [0.32]	0.10 [0.31]	0.10 [0.30]
Race: Hispanic	0.17 [0.37]	0.18 [0.39]	0.17 [0.37]	0.19 [0.40]
Born in US?	0.92 [0.27]	0.91 [0.29]	0.91 [0.29]	0.93 [0.25]
Socio-Economic Characteristics				
Household Income: Average $ (approx.)	59,668 [48,033]	55,052 [45,223]	60,556 [45,293]	58,953 [46,291]
Education: Average years (approx.)	11.73 [4.90]	11.56 [4.87]	11.73 [4.84]	11.44 [4.95]
Employment Status: Not in Labor Force	0.38 [0.49]	0.41 [0.49]	0.40 [0.49]	0.36 [0.48]
Employment Status: Unemployed	0.12 [0.33]	0.09 [0.29]	0.09 [0.29]	0.10 [0.29]
Employment Status: Employed	0.50 [0.50]	0.50 [0.50]	0.50 [0.50]	0.54 [0.50]
Employment Sector: Manufacturing	0.09 [0.28]	0.07 [0.26]	0.07 [0.26]	0.08 [0.27]
Employment Sector: Services	0.36 [0.48]	0.38 [0.49]	0.41 [0.49]	0.42 [0.49]
Student?	0.02 [0.13]	0.04 [0.18]	0.03 [0.17]	0.03 [0.17]
Loss aversion (Scale: 1 to 5)	3.07 [1.50]	3.03 [1.47]	2.92 [1.52]	3.09 [1.55]
Baseline Socio-Political Attributes				
Last Presidential election: Supported Dem.	0.45 [0.50]	0.49 [0.50]	0.39 [0.49]	0.45 [0.50]
Last Presidential election: Supported Rep.	0.32 [0.47]	0.29 [0.46]	0.37 [0.48]	0.36 [0.48]
Trust in government? (Scale: 1 to 5)	2.53 [1.09]	2.57 [1.08]	2.53 [1.10]	2.55 [1.10]
Impact of NAFTA on family (Scale: 1 to 5)	3.07 [0.96]	3.12 [0.93]	3.06 [0.93]	3.10 [0.93]
Children born into better life? (Scale: 1 to 5)	2.83 [1.15]	2.97 [1.13]	2.94 [1.14]	2.83 [1.21]
Satisfied with health of US job market?	0.42 [0.49]	0.43 [0.50]	0.40 [0.49]	0.38 [0.49]
Willing to pay more for US brand?	0.59 [0.49]	0.60 [0.49]	0.63 [0.48]	0.63 [0.48]
Inequality in US a problem? (Scale: 1 to 4)	3.04 [0.94]	3.04 [0.93]	2.91 [1.00]	2.95 [0.96]
Inflation in US a problem? (Scale: 1 to 4)	3.40 [0.81]	3.40 [0.82]	3.45 [0.79]	3.41 [0.82]
News consumption patterns				
Number of days per week (approx.)	4.68 [2.57]	4.78 [2.56]	4.82 [2.52]	4.70 [2.54]
Main tv source: Broadcast tv	0.28 [0.45]	0.22 [0.42]	0.25 [0.43]	0.27 [0.45]
Main tv source: CNN, MSNBC	0.16 [0.36]	0.18 [0.38]	0.18 [0.38]	0.16 [0.37]
Main tv source: Fox News	0.16 [0.37]	0.17 [0.37]	0.16 [0.37]	0.16 [0.36]
Location Characteristics				
Share with college and above (age>=25)	0.30 [0.11]	0.29 [0.10]	0.30 [0.10]	0.30 [0.10]
Autor-Dorn-Hanson measure for 2000s	2.60 [1.89]	2.49 [1.80]	2.57 [2.51]	2.93 [2.47]
Share of manufacturing in employment	0.16 [0.11]	0.16 [0.12]	0.17 [0.11]	0.17 [0.11]
Urban?	0.83 [0.38]	0.85 [0.36]	0.87 [0.34]	0.85 [0.36]
Survey Characteristics				
Duration to complete (secs.)	931 [1,177]	960 [1,132]	862 [657]	883 [1,047]
Treatment duration	34 [126]	31 [90]	29 [36]	25 [34]
Mobile device?	0.66 [0.48]	0.65 [0.48]	0.52 [0.50]	0.54 [0.50]

Notes: See notes to Table 1d.

Appendix Table 2
Effect of Information Treatments on Preferences Towards Trade Policy: Full Results
(Pooled: Round 2, 2020; Round 3, 2021; Round 4, 2022)

Dependent Variable:	(1) First principal component	(2) First principal component	(3) Did information affect views?	(4) Impact of trade for most Americans?
	OLS	OLS	Ordered logit	Ordered logit
Treatment dummies: (Omitted: Control group)				
Trade Hurts Jobs	0.211*** [0.042]	0.242*** [0.043]	0.048*** [0.015]	-0.248*** [0.016]
Trade Helps Jobs	0.049 [0.047]	0.081* [0.044]	0.030* [0.016]	-0.025* [0.015]
Trade Helps Prices	0.099** [0.040]	0.109*** [0.042]	0.028* [0.015]	-0.058*** [0.015]
Tariff Hurts Prices	0.075* [0.042]	0.099** [0.042]	0.046*** [0.016]	-0.164*** [0.016]
Most Pref., Randomization Order		-0.019*** [0.007]		
Individual Controls:				
Gender (Omitted: Male)				
Female		-0.044 [0.029]	-0.040*** [0.009]	-0.053*** [0.009]
Other		-0.200 [0.211]	0.075 [0.090]	0.028 [0.071]
Age (Omitted: 18-24)				
25-34		0.135*** [0.042]	0.008 [0.019]	-0.043*** [0.015]
35-44		0.330*** [0.047]	0.012 [0.019]	-0.081*** [0.017]
45-54		0.500*** [0.054]	-0.090*** [0.018]	-0.171*** [0.019]
55-64		0.621*** [0.060]	-0.116*** [0.020]	-0.171*** [0.020]
Above 65		0.696*** [0.064]	-0.108*** [0.021]	-0.155*** [0.021]
Race (Omitted: White)				
African-American		0.057 [0.047]	0.016 [0.018]	-0.022 [0.015]
Hispanic, Latino or Spanish Origin		0.023 [0.043]	-0.007 [0.017]	0.002 [0.013]
Asian		-0.087 [0.078]	-0.008 [0.022]	-0.028 [0.025]
Other		0.071 [0.081]	0.031 [0.029]	-0.010 [0.031]
Education: College and above?		-0.022 [0.035]	-0.005 [0.011]	0.037*** [0.011]
Household Income (Omitted: $0-$49,999)				
$50,000-$99,999		0.081** [0.033]	-0.005 [0.011]	0.003 [0.011]
$100,000-$150,000		0.114** [0.053]	0.011 [0.017]	0.054*** [0.020]
$150,000-$200,000		0.134* [0.077]	0.093** [0.037]	0.118*** [0.023]
>$200,000		0.254*** [0.088]	0.045 [0.037]	0.182*** [0.021]
Unsure		-0.164*** [0.058]	-0.033 [0.021]	-0.035 [0.022]
Employment Status (Omitted: Not in labor force)				
Not employed, looking for work		-0.013 [0.047]	0.039** [0.016]	0.002 [0.018]
Student		0.092 [0.073]	0.065* [0.035]	0.006 [0.025]
Employed, in Agriculture		0.301*** [0.084]	0.258*** [0.030]	0.163*** [0.025]
Employed, in Mining		0.354*** [0.093]	0.238*** [0.042]	0.137*** [0.028]
Employed, in Manufacturing		0.124** [0.055]	0.121*** [0.023]	0.060*** [0.022]
Employed, in Services		0.042 [0.038]	0.048*** [0.012]	0.028** [0.013]
Responded on Mobile Device?		0.170*** [0.031]	0.040*** [0.010]	0.010 [0.011]
In most recent presidential election (Omitted: Neither)				
Supported Democrat		-0.141*** [0.035]	0.093*** [0.013]	0.089*** [0.012]
Supported Republican		0.625*** [0.040]	0.084*** [0.013]	-0.002 [0.013]
Frequency following news (Omitted: < once a				
1-2 times a week		0.159*** [0.056]	0.056*** [0.016]	0.055*** [0.019]
3-6 times a week		0.169*** [0.050]	0.106*** [0.015]	0.083*** [0.019]
Daily		0.201*** [0.047]	0.105*** [0.014]	0.119*** [0.017]
Main News Source (Omitted: Broadcast TV news)				
CNN/BBC		-0.121*** [0.039]	0.007 [0.017]	0.037** [0.014]
Fox News		0.246*** [0.045]	-0.066*** [0.015]	-0.023 [0.016]
Local TV news station		0.010 [0.039]	-0.089*** [0.013]	-0.067*** [0.013]
News/Evening News/Other program source		-0.144*** [0.041]	-0.118*** [0.014]	-0.054*** [0.016]
Region of Birth (Omitted: New England)				
Mideast		0.136* [0.073]	0.031 [0.026]	0.013 [0.024]
Great Lakes		0.168** [0.069]	0.006 [0.023]	0.005 [0.022]
Plains		0.110 [0.078]	-0.021 [0.024]	-0.000 [0.027]
Southeast		0.096 [0.067]	0.018 [0.022]	0.017 [0.021]
Southwest		0.073 [0.077]	0.031 [0.026]	0.042* [0.023]
Rocky Mountain		-0.131 [0.103]	0.017 [0.030]	0.033 [0.035]

Dependent Variable:	(1) First principal component	(2) First principal component	(3) Did information affect views?	(4) Impact of trade for most Americans?
	OLS	OLS	Ordered logit	Ordered logit
Far West		0.061 [0.067]	0.031 [0.026]	0.021 [0.022]
Others or Missing		-0.116 [0.185]	0.171** [0.077]	-0.056 [0.092]
Not born in US		-0.049 [0.083]	0.031 [0.026]	0.037 [0.027]
County Controls:				
Share with college education (age>=25)		-0.279 [0.172]	0.102 [0.079]	0.254*** [0.069]
Autor-Dorn-Hanson measure for 2000s		-0.003 [0.007]	0.002 [0.002]	-0.001 [0.003]
Share of manufacturing in employment		0.270* [0.158]	-0.055 [0.050]	0.068 [0.052]
Urban?		-0.019 [0.047]	-0.011 [0.016]	-0.014 [0.016]
County characteristics filled?		0.121** [0.059]	0.115*** [0.034]	0.086*** [0.030]
Round-Week Dummies: (Omitted: Rd 2, Wk 1)				
Round 2, Week 2		-0.494* [0.293]	-0.313*** [0.113]	-0.143** [0.065]
Round 2, Week 3		-0.628** [0.307]	-0.264** [0.113]	-0.090 [0.069]
Round 2, Week 4		-0.493* [0.284]	-0.283** [0.110]	-0.150** [0.064]
Round 2, Week 5		-0.605** [0.300]	-0.286** [0.117]	-0.108 [0.075]
Round 3, Week 1		-0.542 [0.387]	-0.347** [0.142]	-0.072 [0.125]
Round 3, Week 2		-0.519* [0.298]	-0.286** [0.113]	-0.118* [0.065]
Round 3, Week 3		-0.478 [0.294]	-0.278** [0.113]	-0.135** [0.065]
Round 3, Week 4		-0.551* [0.311]	-0.256* [0.131]	-0.206** [0.086]
Round 3, Week 5		-0.500 [0.387]	-0.246* [0.133]	-0.239** [0.114]
Round 4, Week 1		-0.207 [0.376]	-0.177 [0.135]	-0.195** [0.098]
Round 4, Week 2		-0.422 [0.296]	-0.281** [0.115]	-0.171*** [0.066]
Round 4, Week 3		-0.468 [0.297]	-0.311*** [0.116]	-0.152** [0.066]
Round 4, Week 4		-0.352 [0.295]	-0.272** [0.118]	-0.223*** [0.066]
Round 4, Week 5		-0.288 [0.307]	-0.326*** [0.120]	-0.156** [0.070]
Constant Term	-0.119*** [0.028]	-0.468 [0.305]	---	---
Observations	9,275	9,275	9,275	9,275
(Pseudo) R-squared	0.003	0.153	0.0488	0.0569

Notes: Based on the Round 2 (2020), Round 3 (2021), and Round 4 (2022) samples; comprising respondents in the "Control" group who received no information treatment (the omitted category), as well as those who received the "Trade Hurts Jobs", "Trade Helps Jobs", "Trade Helps Prices", and "Tariff Hurts Prices" treatments. The dependent variable in Columns 1-2 is the first principal component measure (from Column 6 of Table 4) constructed to be increasing in preferences for more limits on trade; that in Column 3 is a categorical variable for degree of agreement with the statement that the information received affected one's views on trade policy (1="Strongly disagree", 5="Strongly agree"); while that in Column 4 is a categorical variable asked post-treatment on views on the impact that trade has had for most Americans (1="Extremely bad", 5="Extremely good"). Columns 1-2 report OLS estimates; while Columns 3-4 report marginal effects from ordered logit regressions, on the predicted probability that either the fourth or fifth highest ordered category is selected as the response. All marginal effects are evaluated setting the initial values of the treatment dummies to zero, while setting all other right-hand side controls at their in-sample mean values. Column 1 reports a basic specification without additional controls; while Columns 2-4 report the full set of coefficients from the Table 4, Columns 5-7 specifications respectively. Standard errors are clustered by respondent county; ***, ** and * denote significance at the

Appendix Table 3
Robustness: Alternative Samples and Constructions of the Dependent Variable

Trade Policy Questions:	(1) First principal component	(2) First principal component	(3) First principal component	(4) First principal component	(5) Unweighted average	(6) Dummy: ≥3 protectionist policies	(7) Factor Analysis, first factor
Survey Rounds:	2	3	4	1,2,3,4	2,3,4	2,3,4	2,3,4
	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS
Treatment dummies:							
Trade Hurts Jobs	0.176***	0.342***	0.256***	0.242***	0.050***	0.070***	0.133***
	[0.061]	[0.083]	[0.082]	[0.043]	[0.009]	[0.016]	[0.023]
Trade Helps Jobs	0.045	0.050	0.160*	0.081*	0.016*	0.020	0.044*
	[0.063]	[0.083]	[0.084]	[0.044]	[0.009]	[0.016]	[0.024]
Trade Helps Prices	0.060	0.123	0.171**	0.109***	0.021**	0.021	0.061***
	[0.061]	[0.089]	[0.081]	[0.042]	[0.009]	[0.016]	[0.023]
Tariff Hurts Prices	0.096	0.072	0.123	0.099**	0.020**	0.024	0.055**
	[0.066]	[0.081]	[0.087]	[0.042]	[0.009]	[0.015]	[0.023]
Most Pref., Randomization Order	-0.016**	-0.021*	-0.021**	-0.019***	-0.004***	-0.007***	-0.010***
	[0.008]	[0.012]	[0.009]	[0.006]	[0.001]	[0.002]	[0.003]
Last Pres. Election:	-0.165***	-0.148*	-0.101	-0.141***	-0.040***	-0.045***	-0.066***
Supported Democrat	[0.052]	[0.076]	[0.062]	[0.035]	[0.007]	[0.013]	[0.019]
Last Pres. Election:	0.606***	0.615***	0.644***	0.625***	0.125***	0.186***	0.340***
Supported Republican	[0.063]	[0.085]	[0.069]	[0.040]	[0.008]	[0.014]	[0.021]
Individual, county, week controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	4,059	2,257	2,959	9,275	9,275	9,275	9,275
(Pseudo) R-squared	0.165	0.168	0.163	0.153	0.151	0.114	0.152
Std dev. of dep variable	1.342	1.379	1.403	1.371	0.286	0.473	0.743

Notes: The sample in each column is from the respective survey rounds described in the column headings, comprising respondents in the "Control" group who received no information treatment (the omitted category), as well as those who received the "Trade Hurts Jobs", "Trade Helps Jobs", "Trade Helps Prices", and "Tariff Hurts Prices" treatments. The dependent variable in Columns 1-3 is the first principal component measure (as in Table 4, Column 6); that in Column 4 constructs the first principal component using the expanded sample that includes Round 1 (2018-2019); that in Column 6 is an unweighted average of the five policy variables in Table 4, Columns 1-5; that in Column 7 is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the responses on at least three of these five policy questions favored more protectionism; and that in Column 8 is the first factor from a factor analysis of these five policy variables constructed with two factors; each of these measures is constructed to be increasing in preferences for more limits on trade by taking one minus the "Support More FTAs" variable. The controls included (but not reported) are as listed in the Table 3 footnotes. All columns report OLS regressions; the bottom row reports the in-sample standard deviation of the dependent

Appendix Table 4
Robustness: Exploring the "Jobs" and "Prices" Treatments Simultaneously
(Pooled: Round 2, 2020; Round 3, 2021; Round 4, 2022)

Trade Policy Questions:	(1) More limits on imports	(2) US tariff rate increase	(3) Support higher tariff	(4) Support more FTAs	(5) Most Pref.: More limits on Imports	(6) First principal component	(7) Did information affect views?	(8) Impact of trade for most Americans?	(9) Confidence in answer to (8)
	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	OLS	Ordered logit	Ordered logit	Ordered logit
Treatment dummies:									
Trade Hurts Jobs	0.090***	0.072***	0.036**	-0.038**	0.033**	0.243***	0.048***	-0.247***	-0.022
	[0.016]	[0.016]	[0.017]	[0.018]	[0.015]	[0.043]	[0.015]	[0.016]	[0.016]
Trade Helps Jobs	0.022	0.023	0.026	-0.006	0.007	0.079*	0.031*	-0.024	-0.018
	[0.018]	[0.015]	[0.018]	[0.019]	[0.015]	[0.044]	[0.016]	[0.015]	[0.016]
Trade Helps Prices	0.057***	0.029**	-0.005	-0.002	0.030**	0.109***	0.029*	-0.059***	-0.022
	[0.017]	[0.014]	[0.017]	[0.017]	[0.015]	[0.042]	[0.015]	[0.016]	[0.015]
Tariff Hurts Prices	0.039**	0.022	0.018	-0.005	0.023	0.100**	0.047***	-0.164***	-0.029*
	[0.017]	[0.015]	[0.017]	[0.017]	[0.016]	[0.043]	[0.016]	[0.016]	[0.015]
Trade Hurts Helps Jobs	0.045**	0.031**	0.034*	-0.037**	0.049***	0.169***	0.031**	-0.092***	-0.031**
	[0.019]	[0.016]	[0.019]	[0.019]	[0.016]	[0.048]	[0.016]	[0.016]	[0.016]
Trade Helps Hurts Jobs	0.083***	0.054***	0.026	-0.032*	0.025	0.199***	0.039**	-0.205***	-0.029
	[0.018]	[0.017]	[0.020]	[0.019]	[0.016]	[0.045]	[0.016]	[0.016]	[0.018]
Trade Hurts Jobs sans China	0.053*	0.080***	-0.007	-0.025	0.002	0.153**	0.057**	-0.203***	-0.034
	[0.028]	[0.027]	[0.030]	[0.027]	[0.023]	[0.070]	[0.025]	[0.026]	[0.025]
Trade Helps Jobs sans China	0.055**	0.062**	0.015	0.023	-0.005	0.123	0.020	-0.020	0.004
	[0.028]	[0.026]	[0.032]	[0.028]	[0.023]	[0.076]	[0.025]	[0.022]	[0.026]
Trade Helps Prices sans China	0.043**	0.040***	-0.009	-0.020	0.019	0.102**	0.006	-0.047***	-0.014
	[0.020]	[0.016]	[0.019]	[0.018]	[0.017]	[0.047]	[0.016]	[0.017]	[0.016]
Trade Helps Prices sans Cheape	0.060***	0.044**	0.017	-0.012	0.020	0.140***	0.017	-0.055***	-0.007
	[0.020]	[0.017]	[0.019]	[0.019]	[0.017]	[0.048]	[0.017]	[0.017]	[0.016]
Most Pref., Randomization Order					-0.010***	-0.018***			
					[0.001]	[0.004]			
Last Pres. Election:	0.011	0.024***	-0.040***	0.124***	-0.041***	-0.112***	0.097***	0.103***	0.065***
Supported Democrat	[0.011]	[0.008]	[0.011]	[0.010]	[0.009]	[0.027]	[0.009]	[0.009]	[0.010]
Last Pres. Election:	0.190***	0.126***	0.141***	-0.032***	0.145***	0.631***	0.082***	0.010	0.070***
Supported Republican	[0.012]	[0.011]	[0.011]	[0.012]	[0.011]	[0.031]	[0.010]	[0.011]	[0.010]
Individual, county, week controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	16,102	16,102	16,102	16,102	16,102	16,102	16,072	16,072	16,072
(Pseudo) R-squared	0.0694	0.0772	0.0435	0.0677	0.0752	0.146	0.0454	0.0539	0.0316

Notes: Based on the Round 2 (2020), Round 3 (2021), and Round 4 (2022) samples; including respondents in the "Control" and all treatment groups. The dependent variable in Columns 1-4 is an indicator equal to 1 if the respondent indicated support for the policy in a directly-posed question; that in Column 5 is an indicator equal to 1 if the respondent identified "More limits on imports" among his/her three "Most preferred" out of the list of eight policies; that in Column 6 is the first principal component constructed to be increasing in preferences for more limits on trade; that in Column 7 is a categorical variable for degree of agreement with the statement that the information received affected one's views on trade policy (1="Strongly disagree", 5="Strongly agree"); that in Column 8 is a categorical variable asked post-treatment on views on the impact that trade has had for most Americans (1="Extremely bad", 5="Extremely good"); while that in Column 9 is an ordered categorical variable asking respondents how confident they are in their assessment on the impact trade has had for most Americans (1="Not at all confident", 5="Extremely confident"). The controls included (but not reported) are as listed in the Table 3 footnotes. Columns 1-5 report marginal effects from logit regressions; while Columns 7-9 report marginal effects from ordered logit regressions, on the predicted probability that either the fourth or fifth highest ordered category is selected as the response. All marginal effects are evaluated setting the initial values of the treatment dummies to zero, while setting all other right-hand side controls at their in-sample mean values. Column 6 reports an OLS regression. Standard errors are clustered by respondent county, and computed where necessary by the

Appendix Table 5
Summary Statistics: End-of-Survey Recollection of Treatment Information

SURVEY:	Round 2, 2020 (N=6,009)	Round 3, 2021 (N=4,058)	Round 4, 2022 (N=6,035)
Share of respondents who said information was about jobs	0.34 [0.47]	0.36 [0.48]	0.35 [0.48]
Share of respondents who said information was about prices	0.52 [0.50]	0.49 [0.50]	0.50 [0.50]
Share of respondents who said no information received	0.14 [0.35]	0.14 [0.35]	0.14 [0.35]
Correctly identified nature of information treatment	0.47 [0.50]	0.52 [0.50]	0.47 [0.50]
Conditional on receiving a treatment about jobs, correctly identified as such	0.42 [0.49]	0.49 [0.50]	0.46 [0.50]
Conditional on receiving a treatment about prices, correctly identified as suc	0.59 [0.49]	0.63 [0.48]	0.65 [0.48]
Conditional on receiving no information treatment, correctly identified as suc	0.19 [0.40]	0.25 [0.43]	0.22 [0.42]

Notes: Based on the Round 2 (2020), Round 3 (2021), and Round 4 (2022) samples.

Appendix Table 6
Robustness: Controlling for Covid Mobility and Black Lives Matter Events

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Dependent variable:	First principal component, Preference for More Limits on Trade					
Sample:	Rd 2 only	Rd 2 only	Rd 2 only	Rds 2,3,4	Rds 2,3,4	Rds 2,3,4
	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS
Indicator: Below Median Safegraph Mobility	0.028	--	0.032	0.027	--	0.028
	[0.050]		[0.050]	[0.047]		[0.047]
Indicator: BLM Events	--	0.122*	0.102	--	0.108	0.098
		[0.072]	[0.073]		[0.067]	[0.070]
Trade Hurts Jobs	0.161***	0.180***	0.165***	0.236***	0.244***	0.238***
	[0.062]	[0.061]	[0.063]	[0.043]	[0.043]	[0.043]
Trade Helps Jobs	0.039	0.047	0.041	0.079*	0.082*	0.080*
	[0.064]	[0.063]	[0.064]	[0.044]	[0.044]	[0.044]
Trade Helps Prices	0.037	0.062	0.039	0.100**	0.110***	0.101**
	[0.062]	[0.061]	[0.062]	[0.042]	[0.042]	[0.043]
Tariff Hurts Prices	0.075	0.097	0.076	0.090**	0.100**	0.090**
	[0.068]	[0.066]	[0.068]	[0.043]	[0.043]	[0.043]
Most Pref., Randomization Order	-0.016**	-0.016**	-0.016**	-0.019***	-0.019***	-0.019***
	[0.008]	[0.008]	[0.008]	[0.006]	[0.006]	[0.006]
Last Pres. Election:	-0.184***	-0.168***	-0.186***	-0.149***	-0.142***	-0.150***
Supported Democrat	[0.052]	[0.052]	[0.052]	[0.036]	[0.035]	[0.036]
Last Pres. Election:	0.598***	0.604***	0.596***	0.620***	0.623***	0.619***
Supported Republican	[0.065]	[0.063]	[0.065]	[0.040]	[0.040]	[0.040]
Individual, county, week controls?	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	3,874	4,059	3,874	9,090	9,275	9,090
(Pseudo) R-squared	0.170	0.166	0.171	0.155	0.153	0.155

Notes: Based on the Round 2 (2020) sample in Columns 1-3, and the pooled Round 2 (2020), Round 3 (2021), and Round 4 (2022) samples in Columns 4-6, comprising respondents in the "Control" group who received no information treatment (the omitted category), as well as those who received the "Trade Hurts Jobs", "Trade Helps Jobs", "Trade Helps Prices", and "Tariff Hurts Prices" treatments. The dependent variable is the first principal component measure (from Column 6 of Table 4) constructed to be increasing in preferences for more limits on trade. The controls included (but not reported) are as listed in the Table 3 footnotes. All columns report OLS regressions. The "Below Median Safegraph Mobility" indicator is equal to 1 if the survey response was recorded in a county-week that had a lower than median number of visits to key locations of interest when compared across the Round 2 sample (as a proxy for the severity of covid-related mobility restrictions); the indicator is set to 0 in Rounds 3 and 4. The "BLM events" indicator is equal to 1 if the survey response was recorded in Round 2 from a county-week that experienced at least one Black Lives Matter event; the indicator is set to 0 in Rounds 3 and 4. Standard errors are clustered by respondent county; ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.

Appendix Table 7
Exploring Mechanisms: Economic Self Interest
(Pooled: Round 2, 2020; Round 3, 2021; Round 4, 2022; Above-Median Treatment Duration)

Dependent variable:	First principal component, Preference for More Limits on Trade					
Respondent variable (Economic self-interest, z-scored):	Employed in Manuf.	ADH 2000s China Shock Exposure	Education: Less than College	Unemployed	Household inc. <$50,000	Nafta: Bad impact on family
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Trade Hurts Jobs	0.329***	0.331***	0.331***	0.330***	0.331***	0.328***
	[0.057]	[0.057]	[0.057]	[0.057]	[0.057]	[0.057]
Trade Helps Jobs	0.052	0.052	0.052	0.051	0.051	0.055
	[0.057]	[0.057]	[0.057]	[0.057]	[0.056]	[0.056]
Trade Helps Prices	0.090*	0.091*	0.091*	0.091*	0.091*	0.093*
	[0.053]	[0.053]	[0.053]	[0.053]	[0.053]	[0.053]
Tariff Hurts Prices	0.057	0.057	0.057	0.055	0.057	0.058
	[0.058]	[0.058]	[0.058]	[0.058]	[0.058]	[0.058]
Respondent variable	0.025	-0.023	0.001	-0.013	0.073	0.037
	[0.027]	[0.024]	[0.028]	[0.026]	[0.048]	[0.027]
Trade Hurts Jobs	-0.022	0.031	0.059	0.029	0.046	0.030
× Respondent variable	[0.055]	[0.053]	[0.053]	[0.052]	[0.056]	[0.057]
Trade Helps Jobs	0.041	0.043	0.022	-0.023	0.093*	0.090*
× Respondent variable	[0.048]	[0.052]	[0.054]	[0.045]	[0.053]	[0.049]
Trade Helps Prices	0.018	-0.013	-0.078	0.004	-0.000	0.036
× Respondent variable	[0.047]	[0.044]	[0.053]	[0.056]	[0.053]	[0.053]
Tariff Hurts Prices	0.007	-0.003	0.035	-0.036	0.028	0.057
× Respondent variable	[0.049]	[0.045]	[0.060]	[0.054]	[0.055]	[0.058]
Individual, county, week, randomization order controls?	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	5,754	5,754	5,754	5,754	5,754	5,754
R-squared	0.172	0.172	0.173	0.172	0.173	0.175

Notes: Based on the Round 2 (2020), Round 3 (2021), and Round 4 (2022) samples, comprising respondents in the "Control" group who received no information treatment (the omitted category), as well as those who received the "Trade Hurts Jobs", "Trade Helps Jobs", "Trade Helps Prices", and "Tariff Hurts Prices" treatments. For these latter four treatment groups, the sample is restricted to respondents who spent an above-median duration on the treatment screen. The dependent variable is the first principal component measure (from Column 6 of Table 4) constructed to be increasing in preferences for more limits on trade. The controls included (but not reported) are as listed in the Table 3 footnotes; all columns also control for Democrat and Republican dummies for the candidate supported in the most recent presidential election, as well as the randomization order in which "More Limits on Imports" appeared in the Most Preferred policy question. All columns are OLS regressions, in which the respective respondent variable (expressed as a z-score) is interacted with each of the treatment group dummies. Standard errors are clustered by respondent county; ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.

Appendix Table 8
Exploring Mechanisms: Sociotropic Concerns
(Pooled: Round 2, 2020; Round 3, 2021; Round 4, 2022; Above-Median Treatment Duration)

Dependent variable:	First principal component, Preference for More Limits on Trade					
Respondent variable (Sociotropic concerns, z-scored):	Inequality in the US a problem?	Inflation in the US a problem?	Trust in Government	Willing to pay more for a US brand	Dissatisfied with US job market?	Disagree children will have a better life
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Trade Hurts Jobs	0.344***	0.309***	0.330***	0.312***	0.331***	0.332***
	[0.056]	[0.113]	[0.057]	[0.054]	[0.057]	[0.057]
Trade Helps Jobs	0.067	0.165	0.052	0.025	0.062	0.058
	[0.057]	[0.112]	[0.057]	[0.054]	[0.057]	[0.057]
Trade Helps Prices	0.103*	0.177	0.089*	0.070	0.092*	0.094*
	[0.053]	[0.108]	[0.053]	[0.053]	[0.053]	[0.053]
Tariff Hurts Prices	0.078	0.114	0.058	0.039	0.059	0.061
	[0.058]	[0.117]	[0.058]	[0.054]	[0.057]	[0.058]
Respondent variable	-0.126***	0.066*	0.050**	0.317***	-0.062*	-0.056**
	[0.028]	[0.035]	[0.025]	[0.025]	[0.032]	[0.025]
Trade Hurts Jobs	-0.026	0.061	-0.066	0.039	0.074	0.077
× Respondent variable	[0.053]	[0.109]	[0.056]	[0.052]	[0.055]	[0.057]
Trade Helps Jobs	-0.042	0.081	-0.046	0.032	-0.067	0.116**
× Respondent variable	[0.062]	[0.105]	[0.052]	[0.050]	[0.053]	[0.057]
Trade Helps Prices	-0.065	-0.070	0.035	0.058	-0.013	0.019
× Respondent variable	[0.055]	[0.095]	[0.052]	[0.047]	[0.050]	[0.052]
Tariff Hurts Prices	-0.001	0.084	-0.048	0.090**	0.051	-0.012
× Respondent variable	[0.053]	[0.118]	[0.051]	[0.046]	[0.060]	[0.052]
Individual, county, week, randomization order controls?	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	5,754	2,024	5,754	5,754	5,754	5,754
R-squared	0.181	0.180	0.173	0.226	0.175	0.174

Notes: See notes to Appendix Table 7.

Appendix Table 9
Exploring Mechanisms: Behavioral, Political Identity
(Pooled: Round 2, 2020; Round 3, 2021; Round 4, 2022; Above-Median Treatment Duration)

Dependent variable:	First principal component, Preference for More Limits on Trade		
	Behavioral	**Identity Politics**	
Respondent variable (z-scored):	Loss Aversion: No Fees vs. Discount	Supported Republican in last Pres. Election	Supported Democrat in last Pres. Election
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Trade Hurts Jobs	0.332***	0.332***	0.331***
	[0.057]	[0.057]	[0.056]
Trade Helps Jobs	0.054	0.051	0.052
	[0.057]	[0.057]	[0.057]
Trade Helps Prices	0.094*	0.090*	0.091*
	[0.053]	[0.053]	[0.054]
Tariff Hurts Prices	0.061	0.057	0.059
	[0.058]	[0.057]	[0.058]
Respondent variable	0.024	0.274***	-0.011
	[0.034]	[0.033]	[0.033]
Trade Hurts Jobs	0.007	0.031	-0.121**
× Respondent variable	[0.061]	[0.056]	[0.052]
Trade Helps Jobs	0.036	0.123**	-0.113**
× Respondent variable	[0.062]	[0.060]	[0.053]
Trade Helps Prices	0.103*	0.086	-0.119**
× Respondent variable	[0.054]	[0.056]	[0.056]
Tariff Hurts Prices	0.023	0.119**	-0.153***
× Respondent variable	[0.054]	[0.053]	[0.052]
Individual, county, week, randomization order controls?	Y	Y	Y
Observations	5,754	5,754	5,754
R-squared	0.174	0.174	0.174

Notes: See notes to Appendix Table 7.

Appendix Table 10
Reasons for "More Limits on Imports": Comparing treatments with and sans
(Pooled: Round 3, 2021; Round 4, 2022)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Dependent variable: (5=Strongly agree, 1=Strongly disagree)	Agreement Score: Reason for "More Limits on Imports" as a Most Preferred Policy		
	OLS		
Treaments in sample:	Trade Hurts Jobs with/sans China	Trade Helps Jobs with/sans China	Trade Helps Prices with/sans China
Reason:			
Omitted category:	Persuaded	Not persuaded	Not persuaded
Quality Concerns	-0.011	0.009	0.201**
	[0.085]	[0.076]	[0.078]
National Security	-0.092	-0.224**	0.034
	[0.084]	[0.088]	[0.092]
Compete with Jobs	0.327***	0.297***	0.590***
	[0.072]	[0.079]	[0.077]
Concerns about imports from China	0.181**	0.316***	0.586***
	[0.075]	[0.098]	[0.082]
Other reasons	0.049	-0.025	0.316***
	[0.084]	[0.085]	[0.083]
With China × Reason:			
Quality Concerns	-0.101	0.160	0.249**
	[0.113]	[0.100]	[0.103]
National Security	-0.282**	0.282**	0.087
	[0.112]	[0.118]	[0.121]
Compete with Jobs	-0.077	0.145	0.170
	[0.097]	[0.112]	[0.109]
Concerns about imports from China	0.014	0.346***	0.160
	[0.106]	[0.121]	[0.105]
Other reasons	-0.068	0.215*	0.282**
	[0.107]	[0.113]	[0.110]
Response Randomization Order	0.004	0.029***	0.024**
	[0.009]	[0.010]	[0.009]
Individual fixed effects?	Y	Y	Y
Observations	2,682	2,436	3,036
R-squared	0.545	0.505	0.507

Notes: The regression sample comprises respondents in Round 3 (2021) and Round 4 (2022) who selected "More limits on imports" as a top three "Most preferred" policy out of the list of eight policies; Columns 1-3 comprise respectively of the "Trade Hurts Jobs", "Trade Helps Jobs", and "Trade Helps Prices" treatment groups, and their respective "sans China" counterparts. The dependent variable in each column is the agreement score (on a scale of 1-5) with a given reason for selecting "More limits on imports". "With China" is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the information treatment received contained a mention of "China", i.e., is equal to zero for the "sans China" treatments. The omitted Reason category is as listed in each column. All columns control for individual fixed effects, as well as the reason randomization rank order. All regressions are run using OLS. Standard errors are clustered by respondent county; ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%

Appendix Table 11
Baseline versus "sans China" treatments
(Pooled: Round 2, 2020; Round 3, 2021; Round 4, 2022)

Trade Policy Questions:	(1) First principal component	(2) Did information affect views?	(3) Impact of trade for most
	OLS	Ordered logit	Ordered logit
Panel A: Trade Hurts Jobs			
Trade Hurts Jobs	0.239***	0.048***	-0.248***
	[0.043]	[0.016]	[0.017]
Trade Hurts Jobs sans China	0.143**	0.057**	-0.203***
	[0.071]	[0.025]	[0.026]
Test for equality, p-value:	[0.236]	[0.754]	[0.121]
Observations	4,617	4,617	4,617
(Pseudo) R-squared	0.153	0.048	0.072
Panel B: Trade Helps Jobs			
Trade Helps Jobs	0.069	0.030*	-0.029*
	[0.045]	[0.016]	[0.017]
Trade Helps Jobs sans China	0.125	0.019	-0.021
	[0.077]	[0.024]	[0.024]
Test for equality, p-value:	[0.534]	[0.715]	[0.786]
Observations	4,586	4,586	4,586
(Pseudo) R-squared	0.158	0.049	0.046
Panel C: Trade Helps Prices			
Trade Helps Prices	0.118***	0.027*	-0.064***
	[0.043]	[0.015]	[0.016]
Trade Helps Prices sans China	0.138***	0.007	-0.057***
	[0.051]	[0.017]	[0.018]
Test for equality, p-value:	[0.669]	[0.212]	[0.667]
Observations	5,386	5,386	5,386
(Pseudo) R-squared	0.142	0.050	0.052
Individual, county, week, rand. order controls?	Y	Y	Y

Notes: Based on the Round 2 (2020), Round 3 (2021), and Round 4 (2022) samples; comprising respondents in the "Control" group who received no information treatment (the omitted category), as well as those who received the treatments listed in the respective panels. The dependent variable in Column 1 is the first principal component measure (from Column 6 of Table 4) constructed to be increasing in preferences for more limits on trade; that in Column 2 is a categorical variable for degree of agreement with the statement that the information received affected one's views on trade policy (1="Strongly disagree", 5="Strongly agree"); while that in Column 3 is a categorical variable asked post-treatment on views on the impact that trade has had for most Americans (1="Extremely bad", 5="Extremely good"). The controls included (but not reported) are as listed in the Table 3 footnotes, as well as Democrat and Republican dummies for the candidate supported in the last presidential election; Column 1 further includes the randomization rank order in which "More Limits on Imports" appeared in the "Most Preferred" list of 8 policies. Column 1 reports an OLS regression. Columns 2-3 report marginal effects from ordered logit regressions, on the predicted probability that either the fourth or fifth highest ordered category is selected as the response; all marginal effects are evaluated setting the initial values of the treatment dummies to zero, while setting all other right-hand side controls at their in-sample mean values. The p-value reported in each column is for a test of equality of the cofficients/marginal effects for the respective "with China" and "sans China"

Appendix Table 12
Analysis of Text Responses: Occurrence of "China" and "Jobs"
(Pooled: Round 2, 2020; Round 3, 2021; Round 4, 2022)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Dependent variable:	Text response: Listed only China to limit imports from	Text response: Listed only China to limit imports from	Text response: China appears in reasons for more limits on imports	Text response: China appears in reasons for more limits on imports	Text response: Jobs appears in reasons for more limits on imports	Text response: Jobs appears in reasons for more limits on imports
	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit
Treatments in sample:	Three pairs	All available	Three pairs	All available	Three pairs	All available
Treatment with China	0.008	-0.005	-0.005	-0.006		
	[0.023]	[0.015]	[0.054]	[0.024]		
Treatment sans China	0.023	0.008	0.027	0.018		
	[0.023]	[0.019]	[0.048]	[0.027]		
Treatment with Jobs					0.036	0.037
					[0.053]	[0.030]
Treatment with Prices					0.016	0.014
					[0.059]	[0.035]
Test for equality, p-value:	[0.496]	[0.518]	[0.260]	[0.400]	[0.569]	[0.532]
Individual, county, round	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	814	1,323	559	965	644	1,034
(Pseudo) R-squared	0.217	0.200	0.136	0.103	0.112	0.087

Notes: Based on the Round 2 (2020), Round 3 (2021), and Round 4 (2022) samples, the omitted category in each column is the "Control" group who received no information treatment. The odd-numbered Columns include the "Trade Hurts Jobs" , "Trade Helps Jobs", and "Trade Helps Prices" treatment groups, and their "sans China" counterparts, while the even-numbered Columns include all treatment groups; only observations that gave meaningful text responses are included. The dependent variable in Columns 1-2 is an indicator variable for whether "China" was listed as a country on which the respondent supported placing more limits on imports; that in Columns 3-4 (respectively, Columns 5-6) is an indicator variable for whether "China" (respectively, "job"/"worker") appeared in the text response on other reasons for listing "More limits on imports" as a "Most Preferred" policy. The controls included (but not reported) are as listed in the Table 3 footnotes, except that round-group dummies are used in lieu of round-week dummies; we also include Democrat and Republican dummies for the candidate supported in the last presidential election. All columns report average marginal effects from logit regressions. Standard errors are clustered by respondent county, and computed where necessary by the delta method; ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and

Appendix Table 13
Reasons for "More Limits on Imports": The Role of Political identity
(Pooled: Round 3, 2021; Round 4, 2022)

Dependent variable: (5=Strongly agree, 1=Strongly disagree)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Agreement Score: Reason for "More Limits on Imports" as a Most Preferred Policy			
	OLS			
Respondent political identity variable:	Supported Republican in last Pres. Election		Supported Democrat in last Pres. Election	
× Imports often of lower quality	0.040	0.031	-0.034	-0.026
	[0.036]	[0.035]	[0.039]	[0.038]
× Potential threat to U.S. national secu	0.058	0.048	-0.052	-0.043
	[0.037]	[0.036]	[0.041]	[0.040]
× Compete for jobs with U.S. workers	0.047	0.040	-0.035	-0.029
	[0.035]	[0.035]	[0.038]	[0.037]
× Concerned about imports	0.113***	0.102***	-0.101**	-0.092**
from countries like China	[0.035]	[0.035]	[0.040]	[0.039]
× Other more important concerns	0.007	-0.002	0.026	0.033
	[0.035]	[0.035]	[0.037]	[0.036]
Response Randomization Order	0.037***	0.037***	0.037***	0.037***
	[0.006]	[0.006]	[0.006]	[0.006]
Individual fixed effects?	Y	Y	Y	Y
Treatment dummies, Reason dummies?	Y	N	Y	N
Treatment × Reason dummies?	N	Y	N	Y
Observations	7,401	7,401	7,401	7,401
R-squared	0.517	0.522	0.517	0.522

Notes: Based on the Round 3 (2021) and Round 4 (2022) samples, comprising respondents in the "Control" group who received no information treatment (the omitted category), as well as those who received the "Trade Hurts Jobs", "Trade Helps Jobs", "Trade Helps Prices", and "Tariff Hurts Prices" treatments, and who then subsequently selected "More limits on imports" as a top three "Most preferred" policy out of the list of eight policies. The dependent variable in each column is the agreement score (on a scale of 1-5) with a given reason for selecting "More limits on imports". The omitted Reason category is "Persuaded" (for respondents in the "Trade Hurts Jobs" treatment group) or "Not Persuaded" (for respondents in the other treatment groups). All columns control for individual fixed effects; Columns 1 and 3 further include treatment group and reason dummies, while Columns 2 and 4 include treatment by reason group dummies. All columns are OLS regressions, in which the respective respondent political identity variable (expressed as a z-score) is interacted with each of the treatment group dummies. Standard errors are clustered by respondent county; ***, ** and * denote

Figure 1
Exploring Mechanisms: Respondent Characteristics and Preferences for Protection (Level Effects)



Notes: Coefficient point estimates with 90% confidence intervals are illustrated; standard errors are clustered by respondent county. Based on OLS regressions on the Round 2 (2020), Round 3 (2021), and Round 4 (2022) samples; comprising respondents in the "Control" group, and the "Trade Hurts Jobs", "Trade Helps Jobs", "Trade Helps Prices", and "Tariff Hurts Prices" treatment groups.

Figure 2
Exploring Mechanisms: Respondent Characteristics and Preferences for Protection (Interaction Effects)

A: Interaction coefficients with "Trade Hurts Jobs", "Trade Helps Jobs"



B: Interaction coefficients with "Trade Helps Prices", "Tariff Hurts Prices"



Notes: Coefficient point estimates with 90% confidence intervals are illustrated; standard errors are clustered by respondent county. Based on OLS regressions on the Round 2 (2020), Round 3 (2021), and Round 4 (2022) samples; comprising all respondents in the "Control" group, and respondents who spent above-median duration on the respective treatment screens in the "Trade Hurts Jobs", "Trade Helps Jobs", "Trade Helps Prices", and "Tariff Hurts Prices" groups. Each characteristic is examined in a separate regression.

Figure 3
Word Clouds

A: What other reasons led you to select "More limits on imports" as a preferred policy?

Treatments about Jobs

Treatments about Prices

B: On which countries do you support placing more limits on imports?

With "China" in the treatment wording

"Sans China" in the treatment wording

Notes: The top panel compares the occurrence of "China" in the written responses across treatment groups versus sans China in the treatment wording. The bottom panel compares the occurrence of "Jobs" in the written responses across groups that received treatments about jobs versus treatments about prices.

Figure 4
Why "More Limits on Imports"? The Role of Political Identity (Interaction Effects)



Notes: Coefficient point estimates with 90% confidence intervals are illustrated; standard errors are clustered by respondent county. Based on OLS regressions on the Round 3 (2021) and Round 4 (2022) samples; comprising all respondents in the "Control" group, and the "Trade Hurts Jobs", "Trade Helps Jobs", "Trade Helps Prices", and "Tariff Hurts Prices" treatment groups. The dependent variable in each column is the agreement score (on a scale of 1-5) with a given reason for selecting "More limits on imports" as a top-three Most Preferred policy. All regressions include individual fixed effects, as well as a full set of treatment group by reason dummies. Interaction coefficients with whether one supported the Republican candidate (respectively, Democratic candidate) in the most recent presidential election are illustrated.

Appendix Figure 1
Respondent Characteristics and Preferences for Protection (Interaction Effects, Alternative Sample)

A: Interaction coefficients with "Trade Hurts Jobs", "Trade Helps Jobs"



B: Interaction coefficients with "Trade Helps Prices", "Tariff Hurts Prices"



Notes: Coefficient point estimates with 90% confidence intervals are illustrated; standard errors are clustered by respondent county. Based on OLS regressions on the Round 2 (2020), Round 3 (2021), and Round 4 (2022) samples; comprising all respondents in the "Control" group, and the "Trade Hurts Jobs", "Trade Helps Jobs", "Trade Helps Prices", and "Tariff Hurts Prices" treatment groups. Each characteristic is examined in a separate regression.

Appendix Figure 2
Word Clouds: Additional Illustrations

A: What other reasons led you to select "More limits on imports" as a preferred policy?

With "China" in the wording

"Sans China" in the wording

B: On which countries do you support placing more limits on imports?

Treatments about Jobs

Treatments about Prices

Notes: The top panel compares the occurrence of "China" in the written responses across groups that received treatments about jobs versus treatments about prices. The bottom panel compares the occurrence of "Jobs" in the written responses across treatment groups versus sans China in the treatment wording.